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My dissertation examines the relationship between bank conditions and the residential mortgage 
market.  The first essay investigates the effect of bank distress on the residential mortgage market 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis. We use the county-aggregated change in the ratio of jumbo to 
nonjumbo mortgage acceptance rate as an instrumental variable to control for endogeneity between 
bank distress and county economic conditions. The median decrease in the instrumental variable 
explains an additional 1.5 percentage point decline in county home prices and a 20 basis point rise in 
the county unemployment rate, which represent 15% and 5%, respectively, of their median changes 
between 2007 and 2009. The second essay investigates how changes in bank credit standards between 
2001 and 2006 affected county-level credit supply for residential mortgages.  We introduce the ratio 
of conventional loan acceptance rate to FHA loan acceptance rate as a more accurate measure of 
residential credit standard than SLOOS. The ratio shows that credit standards eased significantly 
between 2001 and 2006, which increased mortgage originations and contributed to the housing boom. 
A one standard deviation weakening in credit standards leads to a 1.4% increase in loan acceptance 
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My dissertation investigates linkages between bank conditions and the residential mortgage 
market before and during the financial crisis. Bank distress along with the disruption in the 
securitization markets adversely affected the housing market and economic activity between 2007 and 
2009. The bank lending channel normally operates in the commercial lending market, but it can also 
occur in the residential market when a large share of mortgage originators become distressed 
simultaneously and the securitization market collapses, reducing the ability of creditworthy borrowers 
to obtain financing from alternate sources. The first essay documents a residential bank lending 
channel effect during the 2007-09 financial crisis by showing that bank distress led to a decline in 
economic activity. The most distressed banks reduced lending to otherwise creditworthy borrowers 
after securitization markets collapsed. Mortgage acceptance rates fell more in counties where banks 
were more distressed, which contributed to the decline in home prices and employment. Using the 
most conservative estimates, we find that the median increase in bank distress accounts for an 
additional 1.5 percentage point decline in county home prices and a 20 basis point rise in the county 
unemployment rate, which represent 15% and 5%, respectively, of their median changes between 2007 
and 2009. 
The second essay focuses on the residential mortgage expansion that contributed to the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. One factor that played a major role in the mortgage expansion was the easing of 
credit standards by lenders. We examine the impact of changing credit standards on residential 
mortgage supply, especially during the housing boom years of 2001 to 2006. First. we propose an 
innovative ratio (CF Ratio) as a more accurate measure of residential credit standards than SLOOS. 
CF Ratio is the ratio of the conventional loan acceptance rate to the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) loan acceptance rate. It reveals sharply loosening credit standards between 2001 and 2006, 
which increased loan originations to lower creditworthy borrowers and contributed to the housing 
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boom. After controlling for loan demand, borrower characteristics and county conditions, we show 
that the CF Ratio can partially explain the mortgage credit expansion at the county level. A one 
standard deviation easing of the CF Ratio can explain a 1.4% increase in loan acceptance rate; this 

























A Residential Bank Lending Channel During the Financial Crisis 
Salman Tahsin and Timothy J. Yeager 
 
We document a residential bank lending channel on county-level housing and employment between 
2007 and 2009.  Our innovation is to use the county-aggregated change in the jumbo to nonjumbo 
mortgage acceptance rate proposed by Loutskina and Strahan (2009) as an instrumental variable to 
control for the endogeneity between bank distress and county economic activity.  Mortgage acceptance 
rates fell more in counties where banks were more distressed, which contributed to the decline in 
home prices and employment.  The economic significance of our results are modest, but not negligible.  
The median decrease in the instrumental variable accounts for an additional 1.5 percentage point 
decline in county home prices and a 20 basis point rise in the county unemployment rate, which 
















We empirically document a residential bank lending channel effect on county-level housing 
markets and employment between 2007 and 2009 resulting from widespread bank distress and the 
disruption in private-label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets.  Research on the bank lending 
channel typically focuses on the reduction in economic activity from a contraction in commercial 
lending rather than residential mortgage lending because the effects from the bank lending channel 
come from a disruption of relationships between lenders and borrowers that take time to replace 
(Bernanke, 1983; Ashcraft, 2005; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Gan, 2007; Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydra, and Saurina, 2012; Lemmon and Roberts 2010; Carvalho, Ferreira and Matos, 2015). While 
many business loans depend on long-term relationships to overcome the information asymmetry 
between borrower and lender, relationships in mortgage lending are far less important because the 
information asymmetry is easily resolved through verification of household income and assets 
reported on a standardized application.  If a particular bank refuses to approve a mortgage loan to a 
creditworthy household, healthier banks stand ready to make the loan.  In addition, securitization has 
weakened (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009) the link between bank health and mortgage lending.  Even a 
severely distressed bank should be willing to originate a mortgage to earn fee income if the loan can 
be sold easily to another entity.  Consequently, the mortgage market is not the usual place to search 
for evidence of the bank lending channel. 
To be sure, the economic contraction that resulted from the bursting of the housing bubble 
can be explained quite well without a bank lending channel.  As the housing supply surged beyond the 
capacity of the population to absorb it, home prices fell sharply across the country, impairing 
household net worth (Mian, Rao and Sufi, 2013). Mian and Sufi (2014) find that deterioration in 




Nevertheless, it is possible under certain conditions for the bank lending channel to operate 
in the mortgage market and impose real effects on the economy.  Such conditions emerge when: 1) a 
large share of mortgage originators become distressed simultaneously, reducing the ability of 
creditworthy homeowners to obtain financing from alternate lenders; and 2) the securitization market 
is disrupted so that banks must hold certain mortgages in their portfolios because they can no longer 
sell them into the secondary market.   
Such conditions plausibly existed during the financial crisis and Great Recession.   Figure 1 
shows the annual percentage of loan applications from 2001 through 2009 at all privately held 
depository institutions, the top ten publicly traded originators, and all other publicly traded originators.  
Despite the intense competition in the mortgage market, the top 10 originators in a given year account 
for about 42% of all originations.  During the financial crisis, many large financial institutions such as 
Citigroup, Countrywide, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual rapidly approached insolvency before 
either failing, merging with healthier banks in hastily arranged transactions, or receiving significant 
government aid.  The simultaneous distress of many large banks likely made it difficult for many 
creditworthy households to find alternative lenders quickly.   
Evidence also exists that the private-label securitization market was severely disrupted after 
the second quarter of 2007.  Because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the mortgage GSEs) were taken 
into conservatorship immediately in September 2008 by the federal government, their roles as prime 
mortgage securitizers continued without interruption.  The private-label RMBS market, however, 
collapsed.  Calem, Covas, and Wu (2013) show that jumbo and alt-A MBS issuance effectively shut 
down beginning in the third quarter of 2007.  The stress in the jumbo market is reflected in Figure 2, 
which plots the spread between the yields on the 30-year fixed-rate jumbo and the 30-year conforming 
mortgage between 2006 and 2009.  The spread rose consistently from the second half of 2007 through 
2008 before receding somewhat in 2009.  The disruption of the jumbo securitization market combined 
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with banks’ need for liquidity reduced the willingness of distressed banks to originate even high quality 
jumbo loans because they were unwilling to hold those loans in their portfolios.  Indeed, Calem et. al 
show that banks with greater reliance on the jumbo securitization market and lower capital ratios 
reduced their share of jumbo originations to total originations more than other banks after the second 
quarter of 2007.  Even if banks make mortgage loans when securitization markets are disrupted, they 
are more likely to transfer the risk to the consumer.  Fuster and Vickery (2015) show that banks are 
far less willing to originate 30-year fixed-rate mortgages when the securitization market is impaired, 
transferring the interest rate risk to the households. 
Our contribution to the literature is to empirically document a residential bank lending channel 
effect during the financial crisis by showing at the county level that bank distress combined with the 
disruption in securitization markets contributed to the decline in economic activity.  The central 
challenge in these types of studies is to control for the endogeneity between bank distress and county 
performance.  We minimize endogeneity concerns by using an innovative measure of bank distress 
first explored by Loutskina and Strahan (2009), which is the county-level change in the ratio of the 
acceptance rates of jumbo and nonjumbo loans between 2006 and 2008.  By definition, jumbo loans 
exceed the loan size threshold of the mortgage Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.  A bank that makes a jumbo loan runs the risk of expending precious liquidity 
by holding the loan in portfolio, especially when financial markets are in turmoil.  Most nonjumbo 
loans, in contrast, are conforming loans that are eligible for purchase by the mortgage GSEs, so banks 
have assurances that such loans can easily be sold.  The key insight is that jumbo acceptance rates 
should decline more than nonjumbo acceptance rates when banks are in distress because banks need 
to conserve liquidity and boost capital ratios.  Consequently, a decline in a bank’s ratio of jumbo to 
nonjumbo loans in a given county is more likely to be driven by bank distress than changes in economic 
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or housing market conditions because changes in those real variables should have similar effects on a 
bank’s willingness to make jumbo and nonjumbo loans in that county. 
We run two-stage regressions where the first stage regresses a county’s overall change in home 
purchase loan acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008 on the change in jumbo to nonjumbo 
acceptance rates over the same period.  In the second stage, we regress changes in county housing and 
economic variables between 2007 and 2009 on the estimated change in acceptance rates from the first 
stage.  We hypothesize that a county with a steeper decline in the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio 
will have a steeper decline in the overall loan acceptance rate.  This correlation is not simply 
mechanical.  The decline in the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio is a proxy for bank distress, and 
at the margin distressed banks should be reluctant to approve all types of nonconforming applications 
including subprime and near-prime loans.  In the regressions, we include the county shares of 
subprime and jumbo loans originated in 2006 as explanatory variables to control for the adverse effects 
from subprime lending, and to ensure that the results are not driven by a glut of jumbo housing in the 
boom years.  
Carefully controlling for applicant characteristics and demand and supply factors that affect 
county-level housing markets and employment, we show that counties with the median decrease in 
the mortgage acceptance rate between 2006 and 2008 experience an additional 1.5 percentage point 
decline in home prices between 2007 and 2009.  Counties also experience an additional 20 basis point 
increase in the unemployment rate, and a 1.7 percentage point decline in construction employment 
growth.  These changes represent 15%, 5%, and 7.5%, respectively, of their median changes between 
2007 and 2009.  We conclude that the economic significance of the residential bank lending channel 
during the financial crisis is modest, but not negligible. 
As robustness, we run a second set of tests using propensity score matching.  We match 
counties with otherwise similar profiles in the 2006 pre-crisis year, where banks in one county but not 
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the other subsequently experience a sharp reduction in the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio.  The 
results are consistent with the two-stage least squares results.  We find that in counties where the 
jumbo to nonjumbo ratio drops sharply, mean home prices decline by 1.2 percentage points, and the 
unemployment rate increases by 30bp relative to the control group. 
We run several additional robustness tests.  In one set of tests we use failure probability and 
expected default frequency (EDF) as alternative measures of bank distress.  The residential bank 
lending channel is much stronger in these tests, accounting for about 40% of the decline in home 
prices between 2007 and 2009.  These results, however, likely overestimate the bank lending channel 
effect because of the endogeneity between county distress and bank distress.  We also run the initial 
regressions (using the jumbo to nonjumbo instrumental variable), but we include refinancing home 
loans in the sample along with home purchase loans.  Although the coefficients have similar economic 
significance to the base results, most of the coefficients are statistically insignificant.  We interpret 
these results as showing that the residential bank lending channel operates more strongly through the 
inability of households to purchase homes rather than refinance homes.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the methodology, and Section III 
describes the data and summary statistics.  Section IV presents the main results, Section V discusses 
propensity score matching, and Section VI presents several robustness tests.  Section VII concludes. 
B. Methodology 
In this section, we explain the methodology used to identify the effect of the residential bank 
lending channel on county housing markets and employment, and we introduce the structural model 
for our two-stage empirical specification. 
Our primary objective is to examine the effect of bank distress (combined with the shutdown 
of the private-label residential securitization market) on county home prices and employment.  
Equation (1) models the cross-sectional home price (Home Price) change between 2007 and 2009 for 
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county k as a function of changes between 2006 and 2008 in applicant profiles (Applicant), housing 
supply and demand (Housing), and the county-aggregated acceptance rate (Accept) for home purchase 
loans.   This one-year lag structure allows time for bank distress and the ensuing credit contraction to 
affect housing and economic conditions.  We also include controls for county-level economic profiles 
prior to the onset of the financial crisis (Precrisis).  Bold font indicates vectors.  All else equal, home 
prices should increase more in counties with increases in creditworthy applicants, strong housing and 
economic conditions, and high loan acceptance rates. 
∆𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑘,07−09 = 𝛼0 + 𝜶𝟏 𝚫𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 + 𝜶𝟐 𝚫𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 +
𝜶𝟑 𝚫𝑨𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖+ 𝜶𝟒 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒌,𝟎𝟔 + 𝑢𝑘,07−09             (1) 
 The residential bank lending channel affects home prices indirectly through a reduction in 
acceptance rates by distressed banks, which in turn reduces effective housing demand.  In addition to 
bank distress, acceptance rates are determined by applicant characteristics and housing and economic 
conditions.  We expect the county-level change in the acceptance rate for home purchase loans 
between periods 2006 and 2008, modeled in Equation (2), to be negatively correlated with changes in 
bank distress, and positively correlated with changes in applicant creditworthiness, housing market 
conditions, and pre-crisis county profiles with less exposure to the housing sector.  The intercept 0 
captures changes in acceptance rates common across counties such as changes in national economic 
conditions and credit standards. 
Δ𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑘,06−08 = 𝛾0 + 𝜸𝟏 𝚫𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 + 𝜸𝟐𝚫𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 +
𝜸𝟑 𝚫𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 + 𝜸𝟒 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝟎𝟔 + 𝑣𝑘,06−08       (2) 
Substituting the predicted value (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑘̂ ) from Equation (2) into Equation (1), we derive in 
Equation (3):   
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   ∆𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑘,07−09 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 𝚫𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 + 𝜷𝟐 𝚫𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 +
𝛽3 Δ𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡̂ 𝑘,06−08 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒌,𝟎𝟔 + 𝜀𝑘,07−09        (3) 
The two-stage procedure requires that we find an instrumental variable for county-aggregated 
bank distress that is correlated with the change in loan acceptance rates but uncorrelated with home 
prices changes.  Otherwise, a decrease in home prices in a given county could endogenously increase 
bank distress to the extent that banks are exposed to residential real estate in the county.  Our 
instrumental variable is the change in the ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates between 2006 
and 2008.  For each county, we compute the acceptance ratio of jumbo loan applications (AJ) to 
nonjumbo loan applications (ANJ) in the crisis year t, less the same acceptance ratio in t-1, or 
(AJ/ANJ)=(AJ/ANJ)t - (AJ/ANJ)t-1.  This instrumental variable should be positively correlated with 
loan acceptance rates because both ratios should decline given an increase in bank distress.  It should 
also be uncorrelated with county housing (and employment) decline assuming that the decline affects 
jumbo and nonjumbo housing markets similarly within a county.  Although Loutskina and Strahan 
(2009) and Calem et al. (2013) focus primarily on loan volumes rather than acceptance rates, we focus 
exclusively on acceptance rates because they inherently control for changing loan demand. 
In addition to a change in county home prices, second-stage dependent variables include 
change in net worth, residential investment, unemployment rates, and several measures of 
employment.  Explanatory variables are classified as applicant characteristics, housing market 
characteristics, and pre-crisis profiles. Applicant controls include income growth (Income Growth) and 
changes in loan-to-income ratios (ΔLTI) of jumbo and nonjumbo applicants between 2006 and 2008 
and their squared values to capture nonlinearities.  Housing market controls include the change in 
foreclosure rates between 2006 and 2008 obtained from RealtyTrac, and the change in loan 
applications between 2006 and 2008.  Finally, pre-crisis control variables include the subprime share 
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and jumbo share, respectively, of loan originations in the county in 2006 (Subprime Share 2006 and 
Jumbo Share 2006).  These variables capture the pre-crisis reliance of the county housing market on 
subprime and jumbo lending.  Changes in home prices and loan applications between 2002 and 2006 
capture the intensity of the housing boom.  Precrisis controls also include the ratios of non-tradable, 
tradable, and construction employment in 2006; and the poverty rate and log of households in 2000.  
Following Mian and Sufi (2013), the regression is weighted by the county population to better reflect 
the importance of each county to the national economy.  Regressions without weights give similar 
results. 
As robustness to the instrumental variable approach, we perform a second set of tests where 
we match otherwise similar counties in socioeconomic composition and housing profile pre-crisis, but 
the counties have different groups of mortgage lenders with different levels of distress during the crisis 
as measured by our instrumental variable.   
We use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique as described by Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd (1997, 1998) to match counties.  We separate counties into quintiles by their change in 
jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008.  The binary Bank Distress variable is 
assigned a value equal to 1 for counties in the lowest two quintiles where banks experienced the highest 
distress, and a value equal to 0 for counties in the highest two quintiles where banks experienced the 
least distress.  The middle quintile is excluded from the matching to more cleanly separate the counties.  
We estimate the probability of a geographic area having distressed banks with the following logit 
model: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑘,06−08 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷𝟏 𝚫𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 + 𝜷𝟐 𝚫𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖 +
𝜷𝟑 𝜟𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒌,𝟎𝟔−𝟎𝟖+𝜀𝑘,06−08     (4) 
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The propensity score regression includes the same set of control variables used in the main regression 
equation (3) except for the estimated change in acceptance rates and the square of the jumbo loan to 
income ratio.  The nearest neighbor option matches each distressed county with the healthy county 
that has the closest propensity score within a caliper distance of 0.005.  The mean differences in the 
relevant housing and economic variables are then computed. The results are weighted by the number 
of households in a county. If two or more counties have the same propensity score and are tied for 
nearest neighbor, all tied counties are matched. Unmatched distressed counties are those where no 
suitable healthy county could be matched. 
C.  Data and Summary Statistics 
In this section, we describe the loan application, bank, and county data and present summary 
statistics.  Residential mortgage loan applications in the U.S. are reported by most financial institutions 
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).  The annual dataset contains all loan applications 
received by the reporting institutions, and it includes the loan decision, which allows us to identify the 
effect of bank distress on the loan approval decision.  The HMDA data are freely available from the 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and from the National Archives.  
Reporting institutions include banks, credit unions, savings institutions and other non-depository 
lenders.1  From the HMDA data for the years 2006-2009, we keep only the home purchase loan 
applications because the credit contraction from bank distress directly affects the economy through 
the inability of households to purchase, rather than refinance homes.  As robustness, we run the full 
                                               
1 See http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm for access to the data.  For a depository institution to 
be covered under HMDA, it must meet certain criteria including the following: (i) Total assets are above a 
certain threshold; (ii) it has a presence in an MSA; and (iii) it is federally insured or regulated. For a non-
depository institution to be covered under HMDA, it must meet these criteria: (i) It is a for-profit institution; 
(ii) mortgage loan originations equal or exceed 10 percent of its total loan originations or equal $25 million or 
more; (iii) it has a presence in an MSA; and (iv) either its total assets or the number of mortgage loan 




set of tests on home purchase and refinancing data.  We exclude Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) applications, Veterans Administration (VA) applications, and other applications where we are 
certain that the loans are explicitly guaranteed by the federal government. For these loans, the bank’s 
approval decision is not likely to be influenced by its health because the loans can be sold to the 
government at any time.   
The inability to accurately identify conforming loans potentially bias our results.  The ideal 
measure of bank distress is the change in the ratio of jumbo to conforming loan acceptance rates because 
in theory a change in bank distress would affect only the numerator.  In practice, we use the change 
in the ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates as the instrumental variable because we cannot 
distinguish ex-ante between conforming and nonconforming applications given the absence of credit 
scores and more detailed applicant information in the HMDA data.  Subprime applications, for 
example, are classified as nonjumbo .2  The inclusion of nonconforming loans in the denominator of 
the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio biases against finding a residential bank lending channel.  
The bias occurs because acceptance rates of nonconforming loans (especially subprime loans) surely 
fell sharply between 2006 and 2008, which increases the county jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio 
while the overall county acceptance rate is decreasing.  A similar concern is that we cannot perfectly 
identify jumbo loans in 2008 because Congress increased the loan limits to a maximum of $729,000 
in designated high-cost areas during the year, but the HMDA data only include the year of origination.  
We keep the jumbo limit at $417,000 for the entire year 2008.  Classifying some conforming loans as 
                                               
2 We can (imperfectly) identify subprime loans after they have been made because HMDA reporters are required 
to include the interest rate spread—the difference between the annual percentage rate on a loan and the rate 
on Treasury securities of comparable maturity—for higher priced mortgages.  We define subprime mortgages 
as those where the spread is equal to or greater than 3 percentage points over the average prime offer rate for 
first-lien loans, or 5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans.  Subprime loans large enough to qualify as 
jumbo loans are classified as subprime.   
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jumbo loans in that year increases the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio, which also biases against 
finding a residential bank lending channel.  
Panel A of Table 1 lists the number of HMDA loan applications in our dataset each year 
between 2006 and 2009 along with the mean values of applicant characteristics for jumbo and 
nonjumbo loans.  In total, there are 7.2 million loan applications in the sample, with the number of 
applications declining each subsequent year from 2.9 million to 719,000.  The mean nonjumbo loan 
acceptance rate ranges between 82% and 84% while the mean jumbo loan acceptance rate declines 
from 80% in 2006 to 77% in 2008.  Although the mean decline in acceptance rates seems modest, the 
variation across counties is much larger, and the cross-county variation is what matters for our analysis.  
The mean nonjumbo loan to income ratio is the lowest in 2006 at 2.1, and peaks at 2.6 in 2008, 
potentially reflecting a relatively stronger applicant pool as credit standards tightened and weaker 
households quit applying.  Indeed, mean applicant income and loan amount requested also peak in 
2008.  Similar trends are observed with jumbo applications.  Between 2006 and 2008, the jumbo 
applicant share declines from 10% to 6% while the loan volume share falls from 32% to 19%. 
Summary statistics of bank characteristics are in Panel B of Table 1.  The number of unique 
lenders each year averages about 4,400, and the average bank holds about $3.3 billion in assets. 
Table 2 describes the county-level variables used in the two-stage regression analysis.  When 
we aggregate to the county level, we require a minimum of 17 jumbo loan applications each year, 
which drops the number of county observations from 812 to 478.  Panel A of Table 2 contains a 
comprehensive list of variables, definitions, and data sources.  They are grouped by dependent and 
explanatory variables and by (county) housing, employment, applicant, and county pre-crisis 
characteristics. 
Panel B of Table 2 displays summary statistics across the 478 counties in the sample.  The 
remarkable decline in housing variables reflects the severity of the crash.  Mean county home prices 
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declined 12.8% between 2007 and 2009; residential investment (building permits) declined by an 
average of 54.6%, and construction employment fell by 23.8%.  Loan demand also plummeted.  Home 
purchase applications surged 54% between 2002 and 2006, but they declined 58% between 2006 and 
2008.  Foreclosures rates jumped 567% over the period.  The mean (median) decline in our 
instrumental variable, the ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008, was 
3.5% (5.0%).  We note the high standard deviations of many of these variables, which reflects the 
significant heterogeneity of the impact of the financial crisis across the counties. 
D.  Two-Stage Regression Results 
In this section, we document the effect of the residential bank lending channel on county 
housing and employment during the financial crisis.  All else equal, bank distress reduces banks’ 
willingness to extend illiquid mortgages to creditworthy applicants, which contracts mortgage credit 
and shifts the demand for houses to the left, leading to declines in home prices, residential investment, 
and employment.  
We begin by validating the ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates as a measure of bank 
distress.  We use that ratio as an instrumental variable to control for endogeneity between county 
economic distress and bank distress, and to identify the bank lending channel mechanism as a 
contraction in mortgage credit by more distressed banks. 
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) and Calem et al. (2013) show that banks that are more liquidity 
constrained reduce the volume and acceptance rates of jumbo loans relative to nonjumbo loans.  We 
show in Table 3 that this pattern holds as well for counties where banks are more distressed.  We first 
aggregate the HMDA loan application data by bank and county in a given year so that each observation 
represents a unique bank-county pairing.  We then regress the ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance 
rates on failure probability and applicant characteristics for each year between 2006 and 2009.  Failure 
probability is modeled after the Federal Reserve’s failure model (Cole and Gunther, 1995) and is 
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explained in the Appendix.  The failure probability coefficient is negative and statistically significant 
each year, showing that more distressed banks reduce jumbo lending relative to nonjumbo lending. 
Table 4 reports the two-stage regression results with changes in housing market conditions 
and the unemployment rate as the dependent variables.  The first column reports the first-stage 
regression where the dependent variable is the county change in loan acceptance rates between 2006 
and 2008.  For most counties, the dependent variable is negative because acceptance rates fell during 
that period.  The key explanatory variable is the instrumental variable, Δ(AJ/ANJ) 2006-08, which is 
the ratio of the jumbo to non-jumbo acceptance rates in 2008, less the same ratio in 2006.  Again, the 
variable is negative for most counties because banks contracted jumbo lending more than nonjumbo 
lending between 2006 and 2008; consequently, we expect the regression coefficient to be positive. 
Indeed, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that bank distress contributed 
to the decline in loan acceptance rates.  Note that we include all the control variables from the second 
stage in the first stage as well to improve the model fit. 
Columns 2 through 5 of Table 4 report the second-stage regression results.  The key 
explanatory variable is the estimated change in county acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008, 
Estimated ΔA 2006-08.  Negative values in the explanatory variable reflect declines in the acceptance 
rates between 2006 and 2008.  Home prices, net worth, and residential investment declined between 
2007 and 2009 as well, so we expect the regression coefficients to be positive.  Unemployment rates, 
however, increased so the coefficient should be negative for that regression.  All four of the 
coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant at least at the 10% level.  Several 
of the control variables are also statistically significant and have the expected signs, resulting in strong 
model fits.  The coefficients on the shares of subprime and jumbo mortgages in 2006 consistently 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant, indicating that counties with more of these 
pre-crisis loan originations experienced sharper downturns. 
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The economic significance from the second-stage predicted variable is modest.  A county with 
the median decline in estimated acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008 experiences an additional 
1.5% decline in home prices, which accounts for 15% of the 10.3% percent median drop in home 
prices between 2007 and 2009.  Similarly, the estimated additional changes in net worth, residential 
investment, and unemployment are -1.1%, -2.8%, and 0.2%, respectively, accounting for 17%, 5%, 
and 5%, respectively, of their median changes between 2007 and 2009. 
Table 5 reports second-stage regression results of changes in various county employment 
growth categories.  Although each of the coefficients for the estimated change in acceptance rates has 
the expected positive sign, only the effects on tradable and construction employment are statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better.  The economic significance of the bank lending channel on these 
two employment sectors is notable.  A county with the estimated median change in the acceptance 
rate between 2006 and 2008 experiences an additional 5.4% decline in tradable employment and an 
additional 1.7% decline in construction employment, which accounts for 29% and 8%, respectively, 
of their median changes between 2007 and 2009.  The model fits of the regressions with non-tradable 
and tradable employment growth as the dependent variables are relatively weak so we are reluctant to 
draw strong conclusions from those results.  The shares of subprime and jumbo originations in 2006 
had robust and negative effect on overall employment growth, but the effects on various employment 
sectors were more tenuous especially for the subprime share. 
 In sum, our regression analysis identifies a specific bank lending channel where aggregate 
bank distress in a given county leads to reduced loan acceptance rates, which contributes to the 
housing and employment contraction.  Collectively, the bank lending channel accounts for about 15% 
of the median county decline in home prices and net worth, 5% of the increase in the unemployment 




E.  Propensity Score Matching 
As robustness to the instrumental variable approach, we use propensity score matching to 
match counties that were otherwise similar in socioeconomic composition and housing profiles pre-
crisis, but relied on different portfolios of mortgage lenders with different levels of distress during the 
crisis as measured by the change in the ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates between 2006 
and 2008.  This approach potentially reduces noise relative to regression analysis by eliminating from 
the matching the counties that had high bank distress during the financial crisis because they had vastly 
different socio-economic characteristics relative to counties with low bank distress. 
The logit regression used to match the counties is presented in Equation (4).  The binary 
dependent variable BkDistress is assigned a value of 1 for counties in the two quintiles where banks 
experienced the highest decline in the acceptance ratio of jumbo to nonjumbo loans between 2006 
and 2008, and 0 for counties in the two quintiles where banks experienced the least decline.  The 
middle quintile is excluded from the matching to more cleanly separate the counties.  Explanatory 
variables are identical to those used in the second stage regressions in Tables 4 and 5 with the exception 
of the estimated change in acceptance rates and the square of the jumbo loan to income ratio.  The 
nearest-neighbor PSM technique matches each county with distressed banks with the most similar 
county with non-distressed banks.  Matching with replacement is allowed so that each healthy-bank 
county in the sample is unique, but the distressed-bank counties may be matched more than once.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents the mean differences in the outcome variables between counties 
with high- and low-distressed banks. Counties with distressed banks between 2006 and 2008 
experience an additional decline of 1.2% in home price, 3.8% in net worth, and 2.5% in residential 
investment between 2007 and 2009 relative to counties with health banks.  In addition, the 
unemployment rate in counties with distressed banks increases by 30bp more. Each of these 
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differences is statistically significant at the 1% level.  These results are similar to the base regressions 
results in Tables 4 and 5. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the PSM results for the employment growth variables.  Mean total 
employment growth between 2007 and 2009 is 60bp lower for counties with distressed banks, and the 
difference is statistically significant.  However, results for the components of employment growth 
have unexpected signs.  Counties with distressed banks experience an additional increase of 1% in 
non-tradable employment, 5.1% in tradable employment, and 6.5% in construction employment.   
F. Robustness 
We run several robustness tests on our two-stage regression results.  First, we substitute the 
jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio with two alternative measures of bank distress: failure probability 
and expected default frequency (EDF). 
Failure probability is a measure of a bank’s insolvency risk computed from its financial 
statements (described in the Appendix).  County-level failure probability is the weighted average of 
the failure probabilities of all banks with applications from mortgage applicants in a given county, 
weighted by each bank’s share of the total requested loan amount during the year.  Three important 
differences exist between the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio and failure probability.  First, the 
former is computed from loan application data in a given county, while the latter is computed at the 
bank level.  The jumbo to nonjumbo ratio implicitly assumes that a distressed bank can respond 
differently in each county where it makes jumbo loans.  A bank’s failure probability, on the other hand, 
is more blunt because a bank is assumed to curtail residential loan acceptance rates uniformly across 
counties.  Second, we can compute failure probability only for commercial banks and thrifts; changes 
in lending by credit unions due to distress are excluded.  Third, endogeneity is more of a concern with 
failure probability as the measure of bank distress because the deterioration in economic activity in 
the county may directly influence the health of the bank if it does significant business in that county. 
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Table 7, Panel A reports the results from two-stage regressions substituting the change in the 
county-aggregated jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio for the change in the county-aggregated 
failure probability.  For brevity, we report only the key explanatory variables, and we omit the non-
tradeable and tradeable regression results.  First-stage results in the first column show, as expected, 
that the loan acceptance rates decline more between 2006 and 2008 in counties where banks have 
higher aggregated failure probability.   Second-stage results in columns 2-7 show that the estimated 
change in loan acceptance rates lead to statistically significant declines in housing and economic 
outcomes. Moreover, the results are economically large.  The median change in county-aggregated 
acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008 represent 39% of the decline in median home prices, 34% 
of the decline in median net worth, 11% of the decline in median residential investment, 7.5% of the 
median increase in the unemployment rate, 33% of the median decline in total employment, and 7% 
of the decline in construction employment.  In sum, the residential bank lending channel appears even 
stronger when bank distress is measured with failure probability. 
EDF is a proxy for insolvency risk derived from a publicly traded firm’s equity valuation.  
Distance to default (DD) is the difference between the firm’s market value of assets and its liabilities 
payable within one period, divided by a one standard deviation change in the market value of assets.  
The market value of assets and the volatility of assets returns are, however, not directly observable.  
Recognizing that equity is a call option on the underlying market value of a firm, we can use option 
pricing models to compute a firm’s DD solely from a firm’s market value of equity, equity volatility, 
and book value of debt (Merton, 1974).  Higher values of DD imply lower default probabilities.  
Applying a probability distribution to DD yields the EDF.  We use the Black-Sholes option pricing 




County-level EDF is the weighted average of the EDF of all banks with applications from 
mortgage applicants in a given county, weighted by each bank’s share of the total requested loan 
amount during the year.  As with failure probability, EDF is computed at the bank (holding company) 
level and implicitly assumes that each bank curtails residential loan acceptance rates uniformly across 
counties.  Because EDF can only be computed for publicly traded banks and thrifts, it excludes effects 
from distress at all privately held depository institutions.  Endogeneity, however, is less of a concern 
with EDF than failure probability because most publicly traded banks are large and operate across 
many counties so that deterioration in economic activity in a given county will have a relatively small 
direct effect on the bank’s health. 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the key two-stage regression results using the change in EDF from 
2006 to 2008 as the instrumental variable.  As expected, first-stage results show a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between county EDF and the change in loan acceptance rates between 2006 and 
2008.  In addition, all second-stage coefficients on the estimated change in acceptance rates have the 
expected signs and all are statistically significant except the regression with the total employment 
change between 2007 and 2009.  Again, the economic significance of the results are large.  The median 
change in county-aggregated loan acceptance rates between 2006 and 2008 represent 39% of the 
decline in median home prices, 36% of the decline in median net worth, 8% of the decline in median 
residential investment, 11% of the median increase in the unemployment rate, and 11% of the median 
declines in total employment and construction employment. 
Results from alternate measures of bank distress are consistent with the base results presented 
in Tables 4 and 5.  Moreover, the economic significance of the results with failure probability and 
EDF as measures of bank distress are much larger.  We view the results in Table 7 as benchmarks for 
the maximum influence from the residential bank lending channel because they do not control as well 
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for the potential endogeneity between county performance and bank distress, nor do they provide 
flexibility for bank to respond differently to distress across counties. 
Our final robustness test reverts to our initial measure of bank distress, but it expands the 
sample to include refinancing applications in addition to home purchase applications.  Our story thus 
far is that the residential bank lending channel affects a county primarily through a reduction in the 
demand for homes because distressed banks deny loans to creditworthy applicants.  It is also possible 
that the county is adversely affected if creditworthy applicants are denied refinancing loans because 
overall spending in the county is reduced. 
Table 8 reports the key two-stage regression results using the broader sample of HMDA loan 
applications.  The first stage shows, as expected, a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the change in the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance ratio and the change in the county 
acceptance rate.  With one exception, the second-stage coefficients on the estimated change in 
acceptance rate have the expected signs but only the coefficient for the net worth regression is 
statistically significant.  However, the economic significance of the coefficients are nearly identical to 
those of the base results.  These results suggest that the residential bank lending channel operates 
primarily through the denial of home purchase loans. 
G. Conclusion 
We document a modest residential bank lending channel effect on county housing and 
economic markets between 2007 and 2009.  Households had a more difficult time obtaining financing 
in counties where banks were more distressed because the banks were reluctant to use precious 
liquidity to make long-term home loans that they may not be able to sell in the secondary market.   
After controlling for endogeneity between bank distress and county housing and economic conditions 
using the change in the acceptance ratio of jumbo and nonjumbo loans, our best estimate is that bank 
distress accounts for an additional decline in county home prices of 1.5%, and an additional increase 
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in the unemployment rate of 20 basis points.  These changes represent 15% and 5%, respectively, of 
the median changes in these variables between 2007 and 2009. 
Loutskina and Strahan (2009) document a relationship between bank condition and their 
willingness to extend mortgage loans that are difficult to sell.  Calem et. al (2013) show that banks did 
indeed contract jumbo lending during the financial crisis.  Our contribution is to document a 
residential bank lending channel by showing that bank health has real effects on the economy.  Our 
results expand the growing bank lending channel literature that documents a connection between bank 
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In the mid-1990s, the Federal Reserve developed an econometric model to estimate the 
probability of bank failure within the next two years.  Initially called FIMS, it is commonly referred to 
as the SEER model. (Cole et. al, 1995).   Although the coefficients of the model are confidential, the 
explanatory variables are not.  We use bank failure and call report data from 1986 to 1993 to estimate 
a failure probability model using the same explanatory variables as the SEER model.  Miller, Olson, 
and Yeager (2015) show that estimates from failures during this time period outperform estimates 
updated from bank failures during the financial crisis period between 2006 and 2008.  We then use 
the estimated coefficients to compute failure probabilities for banks and thrifts in our sample.  The 
estimated model is as follows: 
 
Failure Probability = f(-1.7351 + 0.0974*past30_ta + 0.1411*past90_ta + 0.1116*nacc_ta + 
0.0611*oreo_ta + 0.0038*cm_ta - 0.1233*eq_ta - 0.0006*qroa - 0.0201*sec_ta + 0.0235*jumbo_ta) 
 
where f(.) is the inverse of the probit function. 
 
The definitions of the explanatory variables used in the model are as follows: 
• past30_ta:  Loans past due 30-90 days/total assets  
• past90_ta:  Loans past due 90+ days/total assets  
• nacc_ta:  Nonaccrual loans/total assets  
• oreo_ta:  Other real estate owned (OREO)/total assets  
• cm_ta:  Commercial and industrial loans/total assets  
• eq_ta:  equity/total assets  
• qroa:  quarterly annualized net income/average assets 
• sec_ta:  Investment securities/total assets  








Figure 1.  Loan application market share by bank category, 2001-2009     
This figure displays the annual percentage of conventional home purchase loan applications received 
by privately held banks, the top 10 publicly traded banks, and all other publicly traded banks. The 
figure is based on HMDA applications to lenders who are either depository institutions or are 
affiliated with depository institutions. Depository institutions include commercial banks, savings and 
loan associations, savings banks, and credit unions.        
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Figure 2: Spread of 30 Year Jumbo Yield over 30 Year Conforming Yield   
  
This figure plots the monthly yield spread % between 30-year fixed-rate jumbo mortgages and 30-
year fixed-rate conforming mortgages between 2006 and 2009.  Jumbo mortgage yields are from 
Bankrate.com.  Yields on conventional mortgages are from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage 
Market Survey.    



























Table 1. Summary Statistics for Loan Applications and Bank Characteristics       
Panel A. Home purchase loan applications     
This panel displays summary statistics of loan application data in our sample, split by jumbo status.  
From the full HMDA dataset, we retain conventional home purchase applications received by 
depository institutions and their affiliates.  Home purchase loans are those secured for the purpose 
of purchasing a dwelling.  Conventional applications exclude FHA and VA loans, but they include 
jumbo and subprime borrowers.  Jumbo loans exceed the size limit for eligibility to be purchased by 
the mortgage GSEs.  We also report summary statistics on subprime originations because subprime 
loans can only be observed upon origination.  In general, subprime loans are those with APRs more 




Panel B. Characteristics of All Bank Lenders     
This panel displays the number of unique depository institutions by year that reported loan 





2006 2007 2008 2009
Total number of  loan applications 2,911,093    2,448,655    1,175,740    718,767       
Nonjumbo Applications (means) 2006 2007 2008 2009
Loan acceptance rate 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84
Loan amount requested ($000s) 162.6 179.3 219.5 212.2
Loan-to-income ratio      2.1 2.3 2.6 2.5
Income of applicant ($000s) 90.9 93.1 101.2 99.8
Prime Jumbo Applications (means) 2006 2007 2008 2009
Loan acceptance rate 0.80 0.76 0.77 0.81
Loan amount requested ($000s) 679.7 719.3 921.8 910.7
Loan-to-income ratio        3.1 3.1 2.9 2.8
Income of applicant ($000s) 267.6 289.3 424.3 437.8
Jumbo application share 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05
Jumbo loan volume origination share 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.17
Subprime Originations (means) 2006 2007 2008 2009
Loan amount ($000s) 164.0 194.0 185.0 169.0
Loan-to-income ratio        1.9 2.2 2.1 1.7
Income of applicant ($000s) 94.0 98.0 103.0 116.0
Subprime loan volume origination share 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.03
Lender Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009
Unique Lenders 4377 4378 4550 4401
Total Assets ($mil) 3,228 3,587 3,172 3,387
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Table 2.  Summary statistics of economic and bank distress indicators by county   










Growth rate in county median home price between 2007 and 2009. Home Price
data are from Zillow.com.
ΔNet Worth 2006-09
Growth rate in county net worth from 2006 to 2009. Net Worth is defined as:




Growth rate in county residential investment from 2007 to 2009. Residential
investment is based on the cost of construction from residential building permits.
Data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
ΔUnemployment Rate 
2007-09
County unemployment rate in 2009 less unemployment rate in 2007.
Unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
ΔEmp Total 2007-09




Growth rate of county employment in the non-tradable sector from 2007 to 2009.
Non-tradable employment includes restaurant and retail jobs. We use the
employment data at the four-digit industry level to group the industry types into
three categories of non-tradable, tradable, and construction, following Mian and
Sufi (2014). Data are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
ΔEmp Tradable 2007-
09
Growth rate of county employment in the tradable sector from 2007 to 2009.
Tradable employment comprises jobs in industries that have imports and exports
of at least $10,000 per worker or total exports and imports of more than $500
million. We categorize tradable employment following Mian and Sufi (2014). Data
are from the U.S. Census Bureau.
ΔEmp Construction 
2007-09
Growth rate of county employment in the construction sector between 2007 and
2009. Construction employment includes jobs in industries associated with
construction, real estate, or land development. We categorize construction
employment following Mian and Sufi (2014). Data are from the U.S. Census
Bureau.
Loan    
Acceptance     
Rate
ΔA 2006-08
County-level acceptance rate (A) on all sample loan applications in 2008 less
acceptance rate in 2006. Acceptance rates are weighted by loan amount. HMDA
Data are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Dependent Variables






Panel A.  Definitions
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County-level acceptance rate of jumbo loan applications (AJ) divided by the
acceptance rate of nonjumbo loan applications (ANJ) in 2008 less the acceptance
rate of jumbo loan applications divided by the acceptance rate of nonjumbo loan
applications in 2006, or (AJ/ANJ)2008 - (AJ/ANJ)2006. HMDA data are from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
ΔFP 2006-08
County-level failure probability (FP) in 2008 less FP in 2006. Bank FP is
aggregated at the county level and weighted by the bank's application market share
in that county. Data are from call report data obtained from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
ΔEDF 2006-08
County-level Expected Default Frequency (EDF) in 2008 less EDF in 2006.  
Bank EDF is aggregated at the county level and weighted by the bank's application 
market share in that county.  Data are from CRSP and Compustat.
Δ(LTIAll) 2006-08
Change in county-level loan-to-income ratio of all loan applications from 2008 to
2006, or (LTIAll)2008 - (LTIAll)2006. HMDA data are from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Δ(LTIAll squared) 2006-08 Same as Δ(LTIAll) 2006-08 except that all LTI ratios are squared.
INCAll Growth 2006-08
County mean all applicant income growth from 2006 to 2008, or [(INCAll)2008 -
(INCAll)2006] / (INCAll)2006. HMDA data are from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). 
Δ(LTIJ) 2006-08
County-level loan-to-income ratio of jumbo loan applications (LTIJ) in 2008 less
the LTI of jumbo loan applications in 2006, or (LTIJ)2008 - (LTIJ)2006. HMDA data
are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Δ(LTIJ squared) 2006-08 Same as Δ(LTIJ) 2006-08 except that all LTI ratios are squared.
INCJ Growth 2006-08
County mean jumbo applicant income growth from 2006 to 2008, or [(INCJ ) 2008  - 
(INCJ)2006] / (INCJ)2006. HMDA data are from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). 
Δ(LTINJ) 2006-08
County-level loan-to-income ratio of non-jumbo loan applications (LTINJ) in 2008
less the LTI of non-jumbo loan applications in 2006, or (LTINJ)2008 - (LTINJ ) 2006 . 
HMDA Data are available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC).
Δ(LTINJ squared) 2006-08 Same as Δ(LTINJ) 2006-08 except that all LTI ratios are squared.
INCNJ Growth 2006-08
County mean non-jumbo applicant income growth from 2006 to 2008, or
[(INCNJ)2008 - (INCNJ)2006] /(INCNJ)2006. HMDA Data are  available from the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 











Table 2 (Cont.). Summary statistics of economic and bank distress indicators by county 














Foreclosure rate is the number of foreclosures in a county x 1000 ÷ the total
number of housing units. Foreclosure data are collected from RealtyTrac, and the
number of housing units data are collected from the Census Bureau. 
ΔApplications 2006-08
Growth rate in the county-level number of home purchase loan applications from
2006 to 2008. HMDA Data are available from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). 
Subprime Share 2006
County-level ratio of the loan amount of subprime loan originations to all loan
origination in a county in 2006. We define subprime loans as those with interest
rate spreads (the difference between the annual percentage rate (APR) on a loan
and the rate on Treasury securities of comparable maturity) equal to or greater than 
3 percentage points over the average prime offer rate for first-lien loans, or 5
percentage points for subordinate-lien loans. HMDA Data are  available from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Jumbo Share 2006
County-level ratio of the loan amount of jumbo loan originations to all loan 
originations in a county in 2006.  HMDA data are from the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
ΔApplications 2002-06
Growth rate in the county-level number of home purchase loan applications from
2002 to 2006. HMDA Data are available from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). 
ΔHome Price 2002-06
Growth rate in county median home price between 2002 and 2006. Home Price
data are collected from Zillow.com.
Non-Tradable Ratio 2006
Proportion of total county employment in 2006 in the non-tradable sector. Data
are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Tradable Ratio 2006
Proportion of total county employment in 2006 in the tradable sector. Data are
collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Construction Ratio 2006
Proportion of total county employment in 2006 in the construction sector. Data
are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Poverty Rate 2000
Proportion of a county population living below the poverty line. Poverty rate data
are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Log(Households) 2000
Natural log of the total number of households in 2000. Data are collected from the












Table 2 (Cont.). Summary statistics of economic and bank distress indicators by county  








Category Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
ΔHome Price 2007-09 478 -0.128 0.116 -0.448 0.322 -0.103
ΔNet Worth 2006-09 444 -0.096 0.102 -0.723 0.026 -0.066
ΔResidential Investment 2007-09 478 -0.546 0.189 -0.937 0.238 -0.558
ΔUnemployment Rate 2007-09 478 0.048 0.016 0.015 0.099 0.046
ΔEmp Total 2007-09 478 -0.038 0.030 -0.113 0.050 -0.034
ΔEmp Non-Tradable 2007-09 478 -0.065 0.074 -0.297 0.139 -0.063
ΔEmp Tradable 2007-09 457 -0.224 0.227 -0.727 0.114 -0.184
ΔEmp Construction 2007-09 478 -0.238 0.138 -0.625 0.172 -0.221
Acceptance Rate ΔA 2006-08 478 -0.014 0.032 -0.122 0.087 -0.010
Δ(AJ/ANJ) 2006-08 478 -0.035 0.099 -0.173 0.156 -0.050
ΔFP 2006-08 478 0.029 0.014 0.006 0.087 0.026
ΔEDF 2006-08 478 0.306 0.059 0.103 0.509 0.310
Δ(LTIAll) 2006-08 478 0.351 0.181 -0.060 0.980 0.333
Δ(LTIAll squared) 2006-08 478 1.554 0.923 -0.603 3.334 1.500
INCAll Growth 2006-08 478 0.066 0.116 -0.225 0.349 0.076
Δ(LTIJ) 2006-08 478 -0.014 0.296 -0.494 0.583 -0.024
Δ(LTIJ squared) 2006-08 478 0.142 1.962 -3.063 3.892 0.026
INCJ Growth 2006-08 478 0.303 0.363 -0.426 1.039 0.248
Δ(LTINJ) 2006-08 478 0.384 0.184 -0.065 0.683 0.370
Δ(LTINJ squared) 2006-08 478 1.730 1.023 -0.576 3.528 1.650
INCNJ Growth 2006-08 478 0.067 0.105 -0.209 0.428 0.076
ΔForelosure Rate 2006-08 478 5.670 5.185 -1.046 13.823 4.306
ΔApplications 2006-08 478 -0.578 0.112 -0.836 -0.115 -0.585
Subprime Share 2006 478 0.149 0.064 0.037 0.416 0.137
Jumbo Share 2006 478 0.193 0.151 0.018 0.610 0.144
ΔApplications 2002-06 478 0.543 0.414 -0.309 2.912 0.507
ΔHome Price 2002-06 478 0.521 0.317 -0.015 1.836 0.470
Non-Tradable Ratio 2006 478 0.442 0.135 0.025 0.728 0.449
Tradable Ratio 2006 478 0.056 0.046 0.000 0.123 0.044
Construction Ratio 2006 478 0.232 0.070 0.011 0.327 0.231
Poverty Rate 2000 478 0.102 0.044 0.021 0.252 0.095


















Table 3. Effect of bank distress on jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rates  
    
This table shows results from annual regressions of the ratio of jumbo acceptance rates to 
nonjumbo acceptance rates on failure probability and applicant characteristics.  Each observation 
represents a unique bank-county combination.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 


















2006 2007 2008 2009
Failure Probability -0.516** -1.392*** -0.842*** -0.449***
(0.22) (0.20) (0.15) (0.16)
LTIJ squared -0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** -0.014***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTIJ 0.013 -0.054*** 0.002 0.027
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Log (INCJ) 0.004 0.015 0.032** -0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
LTINJ squared 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.044***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
LTINJ -0.077*** -0.101*** -0.220*** -0.256***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Log(INCNJ) -0.044*** 0.007 -0.058*** -0.016
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 1.264*** 1.068*** 1.396*** 1.458***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,389 14,864 9,383 6,210
R-squared 0.017 0.019 0.038 0.034
Dependent Variable:  AJ/ANJ
35 
 
Table 4. Two-stage regressions of bank distress on county housing and employment  
  
Results from two-stage least squares regressions.  The first stage, reported in column 1, regresses the 
change in the county acceptance rate (∆A) between 2006 and 2008 (acceptance rate in 2008 less 
acceptance rate in 2006) on the instrumental variable and control variables.  The instrumental 
variable is the change in the ratio of the jumbo acceptance rate to the nonjumbo acceptance rate, 
Δ(AJ/ANJ), between 2006 and 2008.   Second-stage regressions in columns 2-5 regress county 
housing market indicators and unemployment rate on the estimated change in the county acceptance 
rate between 2006 and 2008.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level of significance, respectively. 
































Predicted ΔA 2006-08 1.476** 1.103* 2.780* -0.210*
(0.67) (0.61) (1.52) (0.11)
ΔLTIJ squared 2006-08 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.009 -0.000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
ΔLTIJ 2006-08 0.002 -0.022 0.006 0.083 0.008
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.01)
INCJ Growth 2006-08 0.006 -0.025 -0.002 0.058 0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00)
ΔLTINJ squared 2006-08 0.013* 0.027 -0.019 -0.057 0.001
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
ΔLTINJ 2006-08 -0.061 -0.002 0.079 0.231 -0.022
(0.04) (0.13) (0.12) (0.28) (0.02)
INCNJ Growth 2006-08 0.014 0.484*** 0.263*** 0.059 -0.041***



































ΔUnemp Rate       
2007-09
ΔForelosure Rate 2006-08 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ΔApplications 2006-08 0.043** 0.066 0.037 0.392*** -0.039***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) (0.01)
Subprime Share 2006 -0.091*** -0.488*** -0.623*** -0.505** 0.039**
(0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.23) (0.02)
Jumbo Share 2006 -0.014 -0.221*** -0.126*** -0.293*** 0.024***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01)
ΔApplications 2002-06 -0.009*** 0.025** 0.036*** -0.007 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
ΔHome Price 2002-06 -0.024*** -0.000 -0.029 0.227*** -0.011***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
Non-Tradable Ratio 2006 -0.013 0.053 0.092** -0.022 0.000
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.01)
Tradable Ratio 2006 0.117*** -0.363*** -0.456*** -0.740** 0.071***
(0.03) (0.13) (0.12) (0.29) (0.02)
Construction Ratio 2006 0.007 -0.194*** -0.088 -0.205 0.017
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.16) (0.01)
Poverty Rate 2000 0.073** -0.010 -0.126 -0.432* 0.063***
(0.03) (0.11) (0.09) (0.24) (0.02)
Log(Households) 2000 -0.003 0.003 0.009* 0.052*** -0.003***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant 0.065*** -0.015 -0.035 -0.719*** 0.044***
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.01)
Observations 478 478 444 478 478








Table 5. Second-stage regressions of bank distress on county employment  
 
Second-stage results of county employment growth between 2007 and 2009 regressed on the 
estimated change in county acceptance rate between 2006 and 2008.  The first stage (see Table 4, 
column 1) regresses the change in the county acceptance rate (∆A) between 2006 and 2008 on the 
change in the ratio of the jumbo acceptance rate to the nonjumbo acceptance rate, Δ(AJ/ANJ), 
between 2006 and 2008.   Second-stage regressions in columns 1-4 regress various measures of 
employment growth on the estimated change in the county acceptance rate between 2006 and 2008. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, 
respectively.  






























Estimated ΔA 2006-08 0.243 0.113 5.303*** 1.647*
(0.22) (0.54) (2.00) (0.86)
ΔLTIJ squared 2006-08 -0.002 0.000 0.029 -0.012
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
ΔLTIJ 2006-08 0.008 0.023 -0.100 0.074
(0.02) (0.05) (0.18) (0.08)
INCJ Growth 2006-08 0.004 0.020 -0.035 0.030
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
ΔLTINJ squared 2006-08 0.001 -0.006 -0.105 0.024
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
ΔLTINJ 2006-08 0.044 0.047 0.614* -0.009
(0.04) (0.10) (0.37) (0.16)
INCNJ Growth 2006-08 0.036*** 0.002 0.053 0.338***





Table 5 (Cont.). Second-stage regressions of bank distress on county employment  



























ΔForelosure Rate 2006-08 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ΔApplications 2006-08 0.081*** 0.095** -0.124 0.346***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.17) (0.07)
Subprime Share 2006 -0.088*** 0.045 0.222 0.159
(0.03) (0.08) (0.30) (0.13)
Jumbo Share 2006 -0.056*** -0.076*** 0.063 -0.207***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04)
ΔApplications 2002-06 0.011*** 0.011 0.037 0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
ΔHome Price 2002-06 0.021*** -0.012 0.175** 0.023
(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
Non-Tradable Ratio 2006 -0.045*** -0.052 -0.142 0.166***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.13) (0.06)
Tradable Ratio 2006 -0.104** -0.063 -0.241 0.016
(0.04) (0.10) (0.38) (0.16)
Construction Ratio 2006 0.019 0.081 0.214 -0.180**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.21) (0.09)
Poverty Rate 2000 -0.016 0.018 -0.086 -0.235*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.31) (0.13)
Log(Households) 2000 0.002 0.004 0.040** 0.037***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.004 -0.049 -0.835*** -0.489***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.22) (0.10)
Observations 478 478 457 478








Table 6.  Propensity score matching   
   
This table reports the results from propensity score matching. Counties are sorted in ascending 
order by the aggregated ratio of the change in the jumbo to nonjumbo acceptance rate between 2006 
and 2008.   Counties in the lowest two quintiles have the most distressed banks, and are classified as 
distressed counties; counties in the highest two quintiles are classified as healthy counties.  The 
middle quintile is dropped from the sample.  The propensity score regression regresses county status 
(distressed or healthy) on the same set of control variables used in the second-stage regression in 
Tables 4 and 5, with the exception of the estimated change in acceptance rates and the square of the 
jumbo loan to income ratio.  The regression is weighted by the number of households in a county. 
The nearest neighbor option matches each distressed county with the healthy county that has the 
closest propensity score within a caliper distance of 0.005.  The mean difference in the relevant 
housing and economic variables is then computed.  If two or more counties have the same 
propensity score and are tied for nearest neighbor, all tied counties are matched. Unmatched 
distressed counties are those where no suitable healthy county could be matched. Panel A lists the 
results for the housing market and unemployment rate, and Panel B lists the results for the various 
measures of employment growth.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 
















Mean difference -0.012*** -0.038*** -0.025*** 0.003***
(Standard errors) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Match characteristics
Number of matches 191 176 191 191
Distinct number of distressed counties 170 144 170 170













Mean difference -0.006*** 0.010*** 0.051*** 0.065***
(Standard errors) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
County type
Number of matches 191 191 178 191
Distinct number of distressed counties 170 170 155 170





Table 7.  Two-stage regressions with alternative measures of bank distress   
     
Results from two-stage least squares regressions.  The first stage, reported in column 1, regresses the 
change in the county acceptance rate (∆A) between 2006 and 2008 (acceptance rate in 2008 less 
acceptance rate in 2006) on the instrumental variable and control variables.  Control variables are the 
same as those in the base regression in Table 4, but most are omitted for brevity.  In Panel A, the 
instrumental variable is the change in the county-aggregated bank failure probability, and in Panel B, 
it is the change in the county-aggregated bank expected default frequency (EDF) between 2006 and 
2008.   Second-stage regressions in columns 2-7 regress changes in county housing and employment 
outcomes between 2007 and 2009 on the estimated change in the county acceptance rate between 
2006 and 2008 and control variables.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level of significance, respectively.  






























Estimated ΔA 2006-08 3.957*** 2.249*** 6.299*** -0.342*** 1.133*** 1.446*
(0.99) (0.68) (1.27) (0.11) (0.20) (0.77)
Subprime Share 2006 -0.032 -0.321* -0.501*** -0.124 0.022 0.022 0.100
(0.03) (0.17) (0.11) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03) (0.13)
Observations 478 478 444 478 478 478 478
R-squared 0.380 0.160 0.543 0.290 0.387 0.410 0.416
Panel B.  Expected default frequency
Variables





















Estimated ΔA 2006-08 3.909*** 2.341*** 4.409*** -0.486*** 0.364 2.449**
(1.07) (0.73) (1.42) (0.14) (0.22) (0.96)
Subprime Share 2006 -0.079*** -0.325* -0.492*** -0.313 0.007 -0.054 0.200
(0.03) (0.17) (0.12) (0.23) (0.02) (0.04) (0.15)
Observations 478 478 444 478 478 478 478
R-squared 0.375 0.174 0.522 0.268 0.176 0.356 0.244
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Table 8.  Two-stage regressions including refinancing applications    
    
Results from two-stage least squares regressions.  Sample includes HMDA applications to 
depository institutions and affiliates for home purchase and refinancing loans.  The first stage, 
reported in column 1, regresses the change in the county acceptance rate (∆A) between 2006 and 
2008 (acceptance rate in 2008 less acceptance rate in 2006) on the instrumental variable and control 
variables.  Control variables are the same as those in the base regression in Table 4, but most are 
omitted for brevity.  The instrumental variable is the change in the ratio of the jumbo acceptance 
rate to the nonjumbo acceptance rate, Δ(AJ/ANJ), between 2006 and 2008.  Second-stage 
regressions in columns 2-7 regress changes in county housing and employment outcomes between 
2007 and 2009 on the estimated change in the county acceptance rate between 2006 and 2008 and 
control variables.  Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% level of 
significance, respectively.        









































Estimated ΔA 2006-08 1.764 4.375*** 5.194 -0.165 0.031 -2.791
(1.62) (1.28) (3.27) (0.26) (0.52) (2.42)
Subprime Share 2006 -0.073* -0.085 -0.109 -0.897*** 0.064*** -0.136*** -0.232
(0.04) (0.15) (0.12) (0.31) (0.02) (0.05) (0.23)
Jumbo Share 2006 (0.04) (0.15) (0.12) (0.31) 0.024*** -0.039*** -0.098
0.007 -0.282*** -0.186*** -0.385*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
Observations 478 478 444 478 478 478 478




Bank Credit Standards and the Residential Mortgage Boom 
Salman Tahsin 
We examine how changes in lender credit standards affect credit supply for residential mortgages.  We 
introduce the CF Ratio – the conventional loan acceptance rate to the FHA loan acceptance rate – as 
a more accurate measure of residential credit standards than SLOOS. Our measure reveals sharply 
loosening credit standards between 2001 and 2006, which increased loan originations to low 
creditworthy borrowers and contributed to the housing boom. Unlike SLOOS, the CF Ratio partially 
explains the mortgage credit boom.  At the county level, a one standard deviation easing of credit 
standards leads to a 1.4 percentage point increase in the loan acceptance rate, which represents 18.5% 



























A.  Introduction 
Residential mortgage credit expansion fueled the housing bubble leading to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. This rapid growth in credit can be partially explained by fundamentals such as falling 
interest rates and rising incomes after the 2000-2001 recession.  The resulting increase in home prices 
created a feedback effect by creating additional equity that new or existing homeowners could draw 
upon for financing.  Fundamentals, however, were not strong enough to explain the credit boom 
(Mian and Sufi, 2009). 
One important factor was the easing of credit standards by lenders, which was especially 
evident in the loans made to subprime borrowers. Duca et al. (2012) find that down payment ratios 
during the subprime boom years were lower for first-time home buyers, reflecting easier lending 
standards and a greater share of loans originated to comparatively riskier applicants. Dell’ariccia et al. 
(2012) find that MSAs with an increase in loan applications experienced a decline in lending standards.  
Lenders gave relatively less importance to the loan-to-income ratios of applicants in these MSAs, 
suggesting that lending standards were lax.   
The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) is the most widely used measure of credit 
standards.  A quarterly survey conducted by the Federal Reserve, SLOOS asks loan officers whether 
they have changed credit standards on different loan types.  The reported measure for a given loan 
type is the net percentage of banks with tighter lending standards (e.g. banks tightening less banks 
loosening) so that positive (negative) values represent tightening (loosening) standards.  Until the 
second quarter of 2007, the survey asked about residential mortgage lending standards as a whole.  It 
has since disaggregated mortgages into several categories and added separate questions about the 
lending standards of each of those categories.3 
                                               
3 Survey data about residential mortgage loans were reported from 1990 to 2007. Starting in the second quarter 
of 2007, the data were reported individually for prime, nontraditional (alternative mortgage loans such as 
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Despite its ubiquity, SLOOS has several limitations as a measure of residential mortgage credit 
standards.  First, loan officers participating in the survey might express their views based on the 
condition of the economy instead of commenting on independent changes in bank lending standards.  
Consistent with this view, Cunningham (2006) finds that SLOOS does not predict well the changes in 
residential mortgage loans.4  Second, SLOOS does not allow for meaningful comparison of credit 
standards across time because it provides the direction, but not the level of credit standards.  We do 
not know, for example, how much tighter credit conditions are in 2017 relative to 2007. Changes to 
the survey questions over time only add to this uncertainty.  Finally, the publicly available survey 
reports only the nationally aggregated lending standards of all participating banks each quarter; it does 
not capture the geographic variation in lending standards.  
Our first objective is to propose a measure of residential mortgage credit standards that is 
more accurate than SLOOS.  Our measure, which we call the CF Ratio, is the ratio of the conventional 
loan acceptance rate to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan acceptance rate.  
Conventional loans are mortgages that are not guaranteed or insured by any government agency at 
origination.  These loans include conforming loans (those eligible for purchase by the GSEs) and 
nonconforming loans.  Nonconforming loans include subprime and jumbo loans.  The key insight is 
that lenders have far more discretion over nonconforming loan credit standards than conforming and 
FHA credit standards because minimum underwriting standards for the latter groups are set externally.  
Consequently, a loosening of credit standards reflected in higher jumbo and subprime acceptance rates 
will lead to a higher CF Ratio.  Unlike the survey-based SLOOS measure, the CF Ratio is based on 
                                               
interest only loans) and subprime mortgage loans.  Beginning with the first quarter of 2015, the survey was 
disaggregated into seven loan categories: GSE-Eligible (for purchase by GSEs); Government; QM non-jumbo 
non-GSE (Qualified Mortgage not eligible for purchase by GSEs); QM-jumbo; non-QM jumbo; non-QM non-
jumbo; and subprime.  Survey questions for prime and nontraditional mortgage loans were discontinued. For 
more details, please visit www.federalreserve.gov.   
4 In contrast, Lown and Morgan (2006) and Bassett et al. (2014) show that SLOOS can predict commercial 
lending and macroeconomic activity. 
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actual lender decisions, provides an absolute rather than relative measure of credit standards, and can 
be computed for various geographies across the U.S.  Two disadvantages are that the CF Ratio has an 
annual frequency rather than quarterly, and it has a relatively long lag time because the ratio is 
constructed from the annual Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) loan application database. 
Figure 1 plots the CF Ratio and SLOOS between 1995 and 2013.5  SLOOS is inverted in the 
figure so that an increase in both ratios represents more lax credit standards. The correlation between 
the CF Ratio and the inverted SLOOS metric is -0.06. The correlation is not only low but negative; 
that is, when the CF Ratio shows easing lending standards, SLOOS shows tightening lending 
standards.  The CF Ratio shows tightening lending standards between 1995 and 1998, and rapidly 
easing standards between 1998 and 2005.  Loosening standards between 1998 and 2005 reflect the 
buildup of the housing bubble, consistent with the literature (Duca et al. 2012). Standards tightened 
sharply between 2007 and 2009, which was likely influenced by the financial crisis. Standards started 
to ease in 2010 and kept loosening until 2013, reflecting the recovery of the economy and financial 
institutions. On the other hand, SLOOS shows modest easing between 1995 and 2000 and modest 
tightening between 2001 and 2003.  The tightening between 2001 and 2003 is inconsistent with the 
significant expansion in residential mortgage credit during these years. SLOOS then shows loosening 
standards between 2003 and 2006, followed by a dramatic tightening between 2007 and 2010, 
reflecting the financial crisis.  Finally, between 2010 and 2013, SLOOS shows loosening lending 
standards, reflecting the recovery in the residential market.  
Using national loan application data, we regress the loan acceptance decision first on the CF 
Ratio and then on SLOOS over the full 1995 to 2013 sample period. We find a statistically significant 
and positive correlation between the CF Ratio and the loan acceptance decision throughout the sample 
                                               
5 Because of changes to the SLOOS survey, beginning with the second quarter of 2007, we average the SLOOS 
survey data for prime and subprime loans, weighted by their share of HMDA loan originations each year.  
Nontraditional loans are excluded because we cannot identify their share of loan originations in our sample. 
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period. The SLOOS coefficients are also statistically significant and positive in the 1995-2000 and 
2001-2006 periods, but the coefficient sign is opposite of what we would expect because it implies 
that tightening credit standards increase the probability of the loan’s acceptance. The coefficients of 
SLOOS in the 2007-2013 and 1995-2013 periods are statistically significant and negative but the 
coefficients are negligible. 
Our second objective is to use the CF Ratio to examine the effect of changing credit standards 
on residential mortgage supply, especially during the housing boom years of 2001 to 2006. We run 
county-level regressions of loan acceptance rates on the CF ratio and find that a one standard deviation 
increase in the CF Ratio between 2001 and 2006 leads to a 1.4 percentage point increase in the overall 
county loan acceptance rate, representing 18.5% of the standard deviation in loan acceptance rates.  
We separate the conventional loan types into prime and subprime and find that the relaxation of credit 
standards boosted subprime lending much more than prime lending.  A one standard deviation 
increase in the CF Ratio increased subprime acceptance rates by 3.0 percentage points, which 
represents 38.2% of the standard deviation in subprime acceptance rates.  
Finally, we assess the ability of the CF Ratio to explain county-level changes in mortgage credit 
over the full 1995 to 2013 sample period.  We find that the ratio’s explanatory power is statistically 
significant throughout the sample period, and the economic significance is stronger in the 1995-2000 
period relative to the 2001-2006 period. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our hypotheses and 
methodology in context with the academic literature.  Section 3 describes the data and summary 
statistics. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
B. Hypotheses and Methodology 
Our study is related to several papers that examine the subprime credit boom (Loutskina and 
Strahan, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Nadauld and Sherlund, 2013; Keys et al. 2010; Demyanyk and 
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Van Hemert, 2011). These papers focus on the supply-side factors that contributed to credit 
expansion.  They support the notion that growth in subprime securitization reduced monitoring 
incentives of lenders, which led to an increase in credit supply for residential mortgages. Our objective 
is to introduce a measure that captures mortgage lending standards directly, and use that measure to 
estimate the correlation with residential mortgage credit expansion. 
We propose three closely connected hypotheses stated in alternative form:   
H1:  the CF ratio is a valid measure of credit standards both at the national and county levels; 
H2:  the CF Ratio is a more accurate measure of national credit standards than SLOOS; and 
H3: the CF Ratio is positively correlated with an economically and statistically significant expansion of mortgage 
credit, especially during the housing boom period.   
We test H1 and H2 at the national level by examining the correlation between a loan’s 
acceptance rate and the credit standard measure, controlling for other factors that influence the loan 
decision.  We expect acceptance rates to rise with more lax credit standards, and we also expect the 
CF Ratio to be more highly correlated with loan acceptance than SLOOS.  We estimate equation (1) 
for the following sample periods: (i) 1995-2000 (ii) 2001-2006 (iii) 2007-2013 and (iv) 1995-2013.  
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑘𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑩𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚𝒌𝒕+ 𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑡  (1) 
We run equation (1) at the loan level using a linear probability model6 where each loan application is 
matched with the relevant county to control for county factors that might influence the acceptance 
decision. Loan Decision is a binary variable for loan applicant i in county k and year t, that equals 1 if 
the loan is accepted by the lender, and 0 if rejected. Loan Demand is the log of loan applications in the 
                                               
6 We contemplated using a logit model with fixed effects, but it has issues arriving at a solution, since we do 
not observe the same applicants over the years. 
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county. Borrower is a vector of loan-level variables that controls for the quality of the loan applicant. 
Economy is a vector of county variables that controls for county housing and economic conditions. 
Lending Standard is the national measure of credit standards in year t, measured either using the CF 
Ratio or SLOOS.  Multicollinearity prevents us from including both variables in the same regression.  
County represents county fixed effects, and  is the i.i.d error term.  Greater statistical and economic 
significance from 4 in the regression when the CF Ratio is the credit standards measure would be 
consistent with H1 and H2. 
An important advantage of the CF Ratio is that we can disaggregate the data by geography 
and relax the constraint of running tests using an annual time series with few observations.  We use a 
panel framework to test Hypotheses 1 and 3 at the county level to examine the effect of credit 
standards on loan acceptance rates. Using Equation (2), we regress the county-aggregated loan 
acceptance rate on the CF Ratio between 2001 and 2006. 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑘𝑡 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑩𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒌𝒕 +
 𝜷𝟑 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚𝒌𝒕+ 𝛽4 𝐶𝐹 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑘𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑘 +  𝜀𝑘𝑡   (2) 
The dependent variable, Loan Acceptance Rate, is the aggregated loan acceptance rate in county k in year 
t. Loan Demand is the log of loan applications at the county level. Borrower is a vector of variables that 
controls for the quality of the county loan applicant pool. Economy is a vector of variables that controls 
for county economic conditions. CF Ratio is the credit standard measure, and Year and County represent 
year and county fixed effects, respectively.  A statistically and economically significant 4 would be 
consistent with H1 and H3.  We also run equation (2) substituting the log of the dollar volume of 
county loan originations as the dependent variable to more directly test H3. 
We theorize that the CF Ratio is a valid measure of mortgage credit standards because it 
primarily captures changes in acceptance rates and loan volume from subprime and jumbo loans, 
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which are likely to have higher variances than acceptance rates and originations of FHA and 
conforming loans where minimum credit standards are enforced externally on the lenders.  We test 
the sensitivity of the CF Ratio directly on the components of conventional loans in two different ways.  
First, at the county level we separately regress prime (including jumbo) acceptance rates and subprime 
acceptance rates on the CF Ratio and control variables.  We repeat the process with the logs of prime 
and subprime loan originations as the dependent variables.  We expect the economic significance of 
the CF Ratio coefficients to be larger in the subprime regressions than in the prime regressions.  
Second, we regress county loan acceptance rates and loan originations on the three components of 
the CF Ratio:  Subprime to FHA, Jumbo to FHA, and Prime to FHA.   Again, we expect to find 
greater sensitivity of acceptance rates and originations to the subprime and jumbo components relative 
to the prime components, which would support H1 and H3.  
We need to elaborate on two of our variables.  Economy controls for housing and economic 
factors because they can affect bank lending behavior (Ruckes, 2004; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2006). 
Variables in this vector include growth in the median home price between year t-1 and t, growth in 
median household income between year t-1 and t, log of county median household income in year t, 
poverty rate in year t, and log of population in year t.  Borrower includes the income levels of 
conventional (CNV) loan applicants and FHA applicants (Log of INCCNV and Log of INCFHA), loan-to-
income ratios (LTICNV and LTIFHA), and the loan-to-income ratios squared (LTICNV squared and LTIFHA 
squared). 
C. Data and Summary Statistics 
In this section, we discuss the county and loan application data and present summary statistics. 
Most financial institutions in the U.S. report loan applications for residential mortgages under the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The HMDA data are publicly available from the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and from the National Archives. The dataset is 
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reported on an annual basis and comprises all loan applications received by the reporting lenders. It 
includes the decision on whether the loan was granted or denied, which allows us to examine the effect 
of bank lending standards on the loan approval decision.  HMDA data include loan applications to 
banks, credit unions, savings institutions, and other non-depository lenders.7 We keep the home 
purchase and refinancing loan applications from the HMDA dataset. Applications to non-banks are 
dropped since our study focuses on bank lending standards. We retain applications only for 
conventional loans and FHA loans, and exclude applications for other loans that are explicitly 
guaranteed or subsidized by the federal government such as VA (Veterans Administration), FSA 
(Farm Service Agency) and RHS (Rural Housing Service) loans. We focus on conventional loans 
because a portion of these loans such as subprime and jumbo loans do not qualify for purchase by the 
GSEs; lenders have more flexibility over the credit standards of these loans than that of FHA loans 
because minimum underwriting standards for FHA loans are decided externally. We include FHA 
loans in our sample as a benchmark for measuring lending standards.  
We include county-level variables to control for socioeconomic trends in U.S. counties. 
Median household income, poverty rate, and population data come from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Unemployment rate data are collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and home price data are 
from Zillow.com. 
In Table 1 Panel A, we list the number of HMDA loan applications in our dataset by year 
between 2001 and 2006. There are 87.4 million loan applications in our sample, and the number of 
applications increases from 12 million in 2001 to 14.8 million in 2006, reflecting the rise in loan 
                                               
7 Visit http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaproducts.htm for access to the data. HMDA covers depository 
institutions that meet the following criteria: (i) Its total assets are more than a certain threshold, (ii) It has a 
presence in an MSA, and (iii) It is federally insured or regulated. HMDA covers non-depository institutions 
that meet the following criteria: (i) It is a for-profit institution (ii) its mortgage loan originations are at least 10 
percent of its total loan originations or at least $25 million (iii) It has a presence in an MSA, and (iv) either its 
total assets or the number of mortgage loan originations exceed a certain threshold. For detailed information 
on the HMDA coverage criteria, please visit www.ffiec.gov/hmda. 
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demand. The mean acceptance rate for conventional loans declined from 77% in 2001 to 72% in 2006; 
on the other hand, the mean acceptance rate for FHA loans decreased from 92% in 2001 to 82% in 
2006. Even though, acceptance rates for both conventional loans and FHA loans declined between 
2001 and 2006, the ratio of their acceptance rates (the CF Ratio) increased during the same period.  
Income of applicants for both conventional and FHA loans increased between 2001 and 2006. The 
mean loan to income ratio for conventional loans increased from 2.0 in 2001 to 2.43 in 2006; the ratio 
for FHA loans also increased from 2.59 to 3.0 during the same period. This trend in loan to income 
is probably a reflection of loosening lending standards.     
Table 2 presents the county-level variables used in our study. In Panel A, we show the 
complete list of variables and their definitions and sources. We categorize them into credit supply, 
credit standards, loan demand, applicant borrower characteristics and county economic variables. In 
Panel B, we present summary statistics at the county-level from 2001 to 2006. We exclude counties 
with less than 31 FHA loan applications and missing county economic data; this drops the number of 
counties in our sample to 904. Mean lending standard, as measured by the ratio of conventional to 
FHA loan acceptance rates, was 0.865 between 2001 and 2006. Overall, there was an improvement in 
the county-level economic conditions as evidenced by the mean growth in home price and household 
income; mean household income growth and home price growth between 2001 and 2006 was 2% and 
8.4%, respectively.  
D. Results 
Our goal is to introduce a direct measure of mortgage lending standards, and use that measure 
to examine the correlation with residential mortgage credit expansion. In Table 3, we report the 
regression results at the national level with loan acceptance decision as the dependent variable on the 
following sample periods: 1995 to 2000, 2001 to 2006, 2007 to 2013 and 1995 to 2013. We regress 
loan acceptance decision separately on the CF Ratio and SLOOS, controlling for factors that might 
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affect lending decision. We expect acceptance decision to be positively correlated with the CF Ratio, 
since easing credit standards will lead to an increase in both the variables. We find that the CF Ratio 
has a positive and statistically and economically significant coefficient in all the sample periods. A one 
standard deviation increase in the CF Ratio explains 3.3%, 1%, 2.2% and 0.9% increase in acceptance 
decisions in the years 1995 to 2000, 2001 to 2006, 2007 to 2013, and 1995 to 2013, which accounts 
for 7.6%, 2.4%, 5% and 2% of the standard deviation in loan acceptance decisions, respectively.  
We report the results regressing loan acceptance decision on SLOOS in the columns 5 through 
8 of Table 3. The SLOOS coefficient is statistically significant and positive in the years 1995 to 2000 
and 2001 to 2007, and statistically significant and negative in the years 2007 to 2013 and 1995 to 2013. 
The positive sign of the coefficients in the periods 1995 to 2000 and 2001 to 2007 is unexpected 
because it implies that the tightening of credit standards led to an increase in loan acceptance. Even 
though the SLOOS coefficient is statistically significant and negative in the periods 2007 to 2013 and 
1995 to 2013, its effect is negligible. The lack of a meaningful relationship between SLOOS and loan 
acceptance decision is consistent with Cunningham (2006), who finds that SLOOS does not predict 
well the changes in residential mortgage loans. The results from Table 3 support H1 and H2, since the 
CF Ratio coefficient is statistically significant and positive in all the sample periods, and is more 
consistent than SLOOS. 
In Table 4, we report county level regression results with loan acceptance rate as the dependent 
variable. We validate the CF Ratio as a measure of credit standards at the county level by regressing 
loan acceptance rates on the CF Ratio, loan demand, borrower characteristics, and county conditions. 
We expect the CF Ratio coefficient to be positive, since counties with easing credit standard would 
experience an increase in both the loan acceptance rate and CF Ratio. The coefficient for the CF Ratio 
has the expected positive sign, and it is statistically and economically significant. We find that a one 
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standard deviation increase in the CF Ratio between 2001 and 2006 can explain an 1.4% increase in 
loan acceptance rate, which accounts for 18.5% of the standard deviation in loan acceptance rate.  
We present the regression results with prime and subprime loan acceptance rates as the 
dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4. To study the effect of the CF Ratio on the different 
types of conventional loans, we separately regress prime and subprime acceptance rates on the CF 
Ratio and control variables. We find that the CF Ratio has a stronger effect on subprime than prime 
loan acceptance rates. A one standard deviation increase in the ratio can explain 3% increase in 
subprime and 0.8% increase in prime acceptance rate, which accounts for 38.2% and 10.6% of their 
standard deviation, respectively. The results from Table 4 are consistent with H1, since it shows the 
validity of the CF Ratio a measure of credit standards at the county level. The results also support H3 
by showing that the CF Ratio has a robust positive correlation with loan acceptance rate during the 
housing boom years.   
In Table 5, we use the same specification as in Table 4, except we use the log of county loan 
originations as the dependent variable to study H3 more directly. We regress log of loan originations 
on the CF Ratio, loan demand, borrower characteristics, and county conditions. Counties with easing 
credit standard will experience an increase in loan originations, thus we expect the CF Ratio 
coefficients to be positive. The coefficients of the CF Ratio have the expected positive sign, and they 
are statistically and economically significant. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the CF 
Ratio between 2001 and 2006 can explain a 2.7% increase in loan originations. Similar to the results 
in Table 4, the coefficient of the CF Ratio is bigger for subprime than prime loan originations; a one 
standard deviation increase in the CF Ratio can explain an 8.5% increase in subprime and a 2.6% 
increase in prime loan originations.  
In Table 6, we report the regression results with loan acceptance rate and origination as the 
dependent variables. We study the influence of the three components of the CF Ratio (Subprime, 
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Jumbo and Prime) by regressing the county loan acceptance rates and loan originations on the ratio 
of Subprime to FHA, Jumbo to FHA, and Prime to FHA loan acceptance rates. We expect the 
subprime and jumbo components to have a bigger effect on the dependent variables compared to the 
prime component, which would support H1 and H3. The coefficients of all three ratios are statistically 
significant and positive; they are also economically significant. We find that a one standard deviation 
increase in the ratio of Subprime to FHA, Prime to FHA, and Jumbo to FHA, between 2001 and 
2006, can explain 1.7%, 0.5%, and 0.2% of the increase in loan acceptance rate, which accounts for 
22.2%, 6.9%, and 2.4% of the standard deviation in loan acceptance rate, respectively.   
We present the regression results with log of loan origination as the dependent variable in 
columns 4 through 6 of Table 6. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of 
Subprime to FHA, Prime to FHA, and Jumbo to FHA, between 2001 and 2006, can explain 2.8%, 
1%, and 0.4% of the increase in loan origination, respectively. The fact that the jumbo component 
has s smaller effect compared to the prime component on the county loan acceptance rate and 
origination is unexpected, since jumbo loan acceptance rates are likely to have higher variances than 
that of prime loans where minimum credit standards are enforced externally on the lenders by the 
GSEs. 
Table 7 presents the regression results for the years 1995 to 2000, 2007 to 2013 and 1995 to 
2013, with loan acceptance rate and loan origination as the dependent variables. To examine whether 
the CF Ratio is a valid measure of credit standard in years other than the housing boom years (2001 
to 2006), we regress loan acceptance rate and loan origination on the CF Ratio and control variables 
in the three sample periods; we expect the CF Ratio coefficients to be statistically significant and 
positive, which would support H1. We find that the CF Ratio coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. A one standard deviation increase in the CF Ratio in the years 1995 to 2000, 2007 to 2013, 
and 1995 to 2013 can explain 2.3%, 0.7%, and 1.9% increase in loan acceptance rate, which accounts 
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for 28.9%, 10%, and 26.4% of the standard deviation in loan acceptance rate, respectively. Similarly, 
a one standard deviation increase in the CF Ratio in the years 1995 to 2000, 2007 to 2013, and 1995 
to 2013 can explain 3.8%, 0.9%, and 2.8% increase in loan origination, respectively. The results in 
Table 7 support H1 by showing that the CF Ratio is a valid measure of credit standard not just in the 
housing boom years but also in other sample periods. 
E. Conclusion 
Subprime securitization and rapidly rising home prices, among other factors, combined to 
loosen residential mortgage credit standards during the housing boom of 2001 to 2006.  Before now, 
SLOOS was the only measure of mortgage credit standards, but its reliability is suspect.  We introduce 
a more accurate measure of credit standard, which we call the CF Ratio.  It is the ratio of the acceptance 
rate of conventional loans to FHA loans.  We show that the CF Ratio is positively correlated with loan 
acceptance rates and originations, both at the national and county levels.  SLOOS, in contrast, largely 
missed the deterioration in credit standards during the housing boom. During our sample period 1995-
2013, the CF Ratio is most sensitive to a rise in subprime originations, though it is also robust to 
periods when subprime originations are small. 
After controlling for loan demand, borrower characteristics and county conditions, we find 
that a one standard deviation easing of the CF Ratio in a given county between 2001 and 2006 explains 
a 1.4 percentage point increase in the county loan acceptance rate, which represents 18.5% of the 
standard deviation in loan acceptance rate between 2001 and 2006.  The same increase in the CF Ratio 
also boosts loan originations in a county by 2.7%.   Our contributions are to provide a new measure 
of credit standards and to show that lax lending standards explain a good portion of the mortgage 
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Figure 1. The CF ratio and SLOOS between 1995 and 2013 
This figure plots the CF ratio (left axis) and the inverted values of SLOOS (right 
axis) between 1995 and 2013. The CF ratio is the ratio of conventional loan 
acceptance rates to FHA loan acceptance rates.  The SLOOS (Senior Loan 
Officer Opinion Survey) measure of residential mortgage credit standards asks 
loan officers whether they have changed credit standards and terms on 
residential mortgage loans. The SLOOS measure is reported as the fraction of 
banks that disclosed tighter lending standards minus the fraction that disclosed 
looser standards. SLOOS is inverted in this figure so that an increase in each 











































































































































Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Loan Applications      
Panel A.  HMDA Loan Applications        
This panel presents our sample of HMDA data for the years 2000 to 2006. We begin with all HMDA home purchase and refinancing loan 
applications to institutions that are depository or are affiliated with depository institutions. Home purchase loans are those that are used to 
purchase a dwelling. Refinancing loans are used to replace existing home loans. We only include conventional and FHA applications. 
Finally, we drop those applications with missing county economic variables to derive our sample. Our sample includes subprime and 
jumbo loans. Jumbo loans are those that do not meet the purchase requirements by the mortgage GSEs because they exceed the loan size 
limit.       
 
 
Application Variables 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total loan applications in our sample 6,934,454   12,000,000 14,200,000 19,300,000 13,300,000 13,800,000 14,800,000 
Loan acceptance rate (sample mean) 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.75 0.74 0.72
Loan amount requested (mean in $000s)115 140 161 165 184 202 210
Loan-to-income ratio (mean)         1.83 2.00 2.11 2.23 2.47 2.52 2.43
Income of applicant (mean in $000s) 77.01 86.79 91.85 92.99 90.42 96.57 105.42
Loan acceptance rate (sample mean) 0.88 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.82 0.82
Loan amount requested (mean in $000s)106 117 120 123 126 129 154
Loan-to-income ratio (mean)         2.40 2.59 2.68 2.84 2.81 2.80 3.00
Income of applicant (mean in $000s) 48.47 51.93 51.60 52.89 52.07 52.29 57.40
FHA application share 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
FHA loan volume origination share 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Loan acceptance rate (sample mean) 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.45
Loan amount requested (mean in $000s)181875 262671 328997 547177 633136 618968 533745
Loan-to-income ratio (mean)         1.93 2.00 2.16 2.40 2.47 2.55 2.54
Income of applicant (mean in $000s) 51.45 56.23 57.17 61.80 63.60 67.33 70.99
HUD application share 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.17








Table 2.  Summary statistics of county economic indicators    
Panel A presents definitions and sources for variables in our sample.  Panel B shows county-level 







County-level acceptance rate of all sample loan applications. HMDA Data
are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Loan Acceptance -Prime
County-level acceptance rate of all sample loan applications to prime
lenders. Prime lenders are those institutions that are not identified as
subprime lenders in the HUD lender lsit. 
Loan Acceptance - Subprime
County-level acceptance rate of all sample loan applications to subprime
lenders. Subprime lenders are those institutions that are identified as
subprime lenders in the HUD lender lsit. 
Log(Loan Origination) Log of county-level loan originations of all sanple loan applications.
Log(Loan Origination) - 
Prime
Log of county-level loan originations of all sanple loan applications to
prime lenders.
Log(Loan Origination) - 
Subprime
Log of county-level loan originations of all sanple loan applications to
subprime lenders.
Conventional to FHA Ratio 
County-level acceptance rate of conventional loan applications divided by
the acceptance rate of FHA loan applications. HMDA data are from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Subprime to FHA Ratio 
County-level acceptance rate of subprime loan applications divided by the
acceptance rate of FHA loan applications. Subprime lenders are those
institutions that are identified as subprime lenders in the HUD lender lsit.
List of subprime lenders are from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. HMDA data are from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Prime to FHA Ratio 
County-level acceptance rate of prime loan applications divided by the
acceptance rate of FHA loan applications. Prime lenders are those
institutions that are not identified as subprime lenders in the HUD lender
lsit. List of subprime lenders are from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. HMDA data are from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Jumbo to FHA Ratio 
County-level acceptance rate of jumbo loan applications divided by the
acceptance rate of FHA loan applications. HMDA data are from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
SLOOS
The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), conducted by the
Federal Reserve, asks loan officers whether they have changed credit
standards and terms on different loan types. We use the survey about
residential real estate loans. It is reported as the fraction of banks that
disclosed tighter lending standards minus the fraction that disclosed looser
standards. Data are available from the Federal Reserve.

















Log of the total number of home purchase and refinancing loan applications at
the county level. HMDA Data are available from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 
LTICNV
County-level loan-to-income ratio of conventional loan applications. HMDA
Data are available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC).
LTICNV squared Square of LTICNV ratio.
Log(INCCNV)
Log of mean income of conventional loan applicants at the county level. HMDA
Data are available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC). 
LTIFHA
County-level loan-to-income ratio of FHA loan applications. HMDA data are
from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
LTIFHA squared Square of LTIFHA ratio.
Log(INCFHA)
Log of mean income of FHA loan applicants at the county level. HMDA data
are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 
FHA Loan Share
County-level ratio of the loan origination amount of FHA loans to the loan
origination amount of all loans. HMDA data are from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Prime Jumbo Loan 
Share
County-level ratio of the loan origination amount of prime jumbo loans to the
loan origination amount of all loans. Prime loans are loan applications to prime
lenders based on the HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List.
HMDA data are from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC).
HUD Subprime Loan 
Share 
County-level ratio of the loan origination amount of subprime lenders to the
loan origination amount of all lenders. Subprime lenders are identified using
HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List. HMDA data are from
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Log(Household 
Income)
Log of median household income at the county level. Household Income data
are collected from U.S. Census Bureau.
Household Income 
Growth
Growth rate in county median household income between year t-1 and t . 
Household Income data are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Home Price Growth
Growth rate in county median home price between year t-1 and t . Home Price
data are collected from Zillow.com.
Unemployment Rate 
County unemployment rate. Unemployment data are from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Poverty Rate
Proportion of a county population living below the poverty line. Poverty
fraction data are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Log(Population) 
Log of the county-level population. Data are collected from the U.S. Census
Bureau. 










Table 2 (Cont.). Summary statistics of county level variables between 2001 and 2006  










Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Loan Acceptance 4687 0.746 0.077 0.457 0.940 0.750
Loan Acceptance -Prime 4687 0.809 0.077 0.506 0.959 0.823
Loan Acceptance - Subprime 4687 0.453 0.079 0.217 0.722 0.446
Log(Loan Origination) 4687 13.371 1.535 9.563 18.220 13.301
Log(Loan Origination) - Prime 4687 13.309 1.533 9.497 18.205 13.232
Log(Loan Origination) - Subprime 4687 10.867 1.546 6.958 15.769 10.700
Conventional to FHA Ratio 4687 0.865 0.097 0.490 1.528 0.868
Subprime to FHA Ratio 4687 0.533 0.105 0.256 1.129 0.524
Prime to FHA Ratio 4687 0.964 0.081 0.632 1.588 0.964
Jumbo to FHA Ratio 4658 0.913 0.168 0.000 2.053 0.928
Log(Number of Applications) 4687 8.980 1.247 5.986 12.945 8.882
FHA Loan Share 4687 0.038 0.028 0.000 0.354 0.032
Prime Jumbo Loan Share 4658 0.113 0.114 0.000 0.763 0.076
HUD Subprime Loan Share 4687 0.186 0.070 0.019 0.488 0.181
LTICNV 4687 2.067 0.365 1.207 6.421 2.027
LTICNV squared 4687 5.591 1.813 2.017 13.880 5.284
Log(INCCNV) 4687 4.332 0.244 3.752 5.679 4.299
LTIFHA 4687 2.657 0.711 1.353 23.610 2.585
LTIFHA squared 4687 7.648 2.687 2.067 33.004 7.311
Log(INCFHA) 4687 3.914 0.184 3.443 5.155 3.885
Log(Household Income) 4687 3.777 0.237 3.219 4.605 3.752
Household Income Growth 4687 0.020 0.034 -0.125 0.260 0.018
Home Price Growth 4687 0.084 0.074 -0.149 0.238 0.076
Unemployment Rate 4687 0.052 0.016 0.016 0.170 0.050
Poverty Rate 4687 0.114 0.042 0.022 0.347 0.111










Table 3.  Effect of lending standards on loan acceptance decisions          
This table regresses loan acceptance decision on lending standard between (i) 1995 and 2000 (ii) 2001 and 2006 (iii) 2007 and 2013, and (iv) 
1995 and 2013 using a linear probability model. The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals 1 if the loan application is accepted 
and zero otherwise. Conforming to FHA (CF) ratio measures lending standard, and it is aggregated at the national level. Other explanatory 
variables include borrower characteristics and county-level variables that could impact loan acceptance decision. Home price growth and 
household income growth are the growth in median home price and median household income, respectively, between year t-1 and t. All 
other variables, including the dependent variables are in year t. We run the regressions at the loan level using a 1% subsample (stratified by 
year and county) of our sample. We hypothesize that the CF ratio is a better measure of lending standards than SLOOS. The SLOOS 
variable captures bank lending standards for all banks in the country. It is reported as the fraction of banks that disclosed tighter lending 
standards minus the fraction that disclosed looser standards, thus we expect a negative relationship between SLOOS and loan acceptance 
decision. However, we find a statistically significant positive effect of SLOOS on the dependent variable from 1995 to 2000 and 2001 to 
2006, implying that tightening standards led to an increase in loan acceptance decisions. SLOOS has the correct sign from 2007 to 2013 
and 1995 to 2013. We find that the CF ratio a statistically significant positive effect on loan acceptance decision in all the four sample 





















VARIABLES 1995-00 2001-06 2007-13 1995-13 1995-00 2001-06 2007-13 1995-13
Conforming to FHA Ratio 0.851*** 0.480*** 0.359*** 0.103***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
SLOOS 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Applications) 0.005*** 0.051*** 0.063*** 0.031*** 0.016*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.031***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Loan FHA Share -0.143*** 0.028* -0.138*** -0.050*** -0.212*** -0.136*** -0.066*** 0.001
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Loan Prime-Jumbo Share -0.144*** 0.024*** -0.031*** 0.014*** -0.159*** 0.010** -0.051*** 0.008***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Loan SubPrime Share -0.532*** -0.601*** -0.721*** -0.822*** -0.851*** -0.348*** -0.909*** -0.822***





























VARIABLES 1995-00 2001-06 2007-13 1995-13 1995-00 2001-06 2007-13 1995-13
LTICNV squared 0.001*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTICNV  0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000* 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LogINCCNV 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.039*** 0.069*** 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.040*** 0.071***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Household Income) 0.005 -0.059*** 0.012** -0.102*** -0.022*** 0.016*** 0.016*** -0.074***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Household Income Growth 0.101*** -0.244*** -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.038* -0.094*** -0.104*** -0.070***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Home Price Growth 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate -0.002*** 0.004*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poverty Level -0.382*** -0.722*** 0.048* -0.730*** -0.380*** -0.383*** 0.062** -0.620***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Log (Total Population) -0.004** -0.046*** -0.067*** -0.027*** -0.012*** -0.035*** -0.063*** -0.029***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.314*** 0.437*** 0.531*** 0.988*** 0.560*** 0.554*** 0.878*** 0.967***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 448,095 964,963 627,456 2,040,514 448,095 964,963 627,456 2,040,514
R-squared 0.047 0.040 0.047 0.040 0.045 0.042 0.047 0.040





Table 4.  Effect of lending standards on loan acceptance rate at the county level  
  
This table regresses county-level loan acceptance rate on lending standard from the year 2001 to 
2006. The dependent variable is loan acceptance rate aggregated at the county level. Conventional to 
FHA (CF) ratio measures lending standard, and it is aggregated at the county level. Other 
explanatory variables include borrower characteristics and county-level variables that could impact 
the loan acceptance rate. Home price growth and household income growth are the growth in 
median home price and median household income, respectively, between year t-1 and t. All other 
variables, including the dependent variables are in year t. The regressions include county and year 
fixed effects. We hypothesize that CF ratio captures lending standards and can thus explain loan 
acceptance rates at the county level. In column 1, we find that loosening lending standards has a 
statistically significant effect on loan acceptance rate. Since, we know that lending standards 
loosened significantly for subprime mortgages between 2001 and 2006, we examine the effect of CF 
ratio separately on prime and subprime loan acceptance rate; we separate loans into prime and 
subprime based on the HUD list for subprime lenders. We expect the ratio to have a stronger effect 
on subprime loan acceptance rate. We present the regression results for prime and subprime loans in 
columns 2 and 3, respectively. We find that the CF ratio has a statistically significant effect on the 
loan acceptance rate for both prime and subprime loans. As expected, it has a stronger effect on 















Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
VARIABLES 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
Conventional to FHA Ratio 0.147*** 0.084*** 0.312***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Log(Applications) 0.049*** 0.013*** -0.090***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Loan FHA Share 0.000 -0.007 -0.236***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Loan Prime-Jumbo Share -0.061*** -0.060*** 0.131***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)















Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate
VARIABLES 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
LTICNV squared -0.002** -0.004*** -0.015***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTICNV  0.020*** 0.009*** 0.083***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
LogINCCNV 0.081*** 0.106*** -0.110***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
LTIFHA squared -0.002*** 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTIFHA  0.001* 0.002** -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LogINCFHA 0.003 0.019*** -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Household Income) 0.048*** 0.066*** 0.279***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Household Income Growth 0.003 -0.015 -0.206***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
Home Price Growth 0.037*** 0.024*** 0.154***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Unemployment Rate -0.172*** -0.128* -0.706***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.20)
Poverty Level -0.069* -0.120*** -0.123
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13)
Log (Total Population) -0.075*** 0.013 0.236***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Constant 0.557*** -0.256 -2.792***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.48)
Observations 4,687 4,687 2,207
R-squared 0.804 0.896 0.640





Table 5.  Effect of lending standards on mortgage credit expansion at the county level 
   
This table regresses county-level loan origination on lending standard from the year 2001 to 2006. 
The dependent variable is the log of loan originations aggregated at the county level. Conforming to 
FHA (CF) ratio measures lending standard, and it is aggregated at the county level. Other 
explanatory variables include borrower characteristics and county-level variables that could impact 
loan originations. Home price growth and household income growth are the growth in median 
home price and median household income, respectively, between year t-1 and t. All other variables, 
including the dependent variables are in year t. The regressions include county and year fixed effects. 
We hypothesize that loosening lending standards between 2001 and 2006 contributed to the 
mortgage credit expansion at the county level. In column 1, we find that loosening lending standards 
has a statistically significant effect on loan originations. Since, we know that lending standards 
loosened significantly for subprime mortgages between 2001 and 2006, we examine the effect of the 
CF ratio separately on prime and subprime loan originations. We present the regression results for 
prime and subprime loans in columns 2 and 3, respectively. We find that loosening lending 
standards, as measured by the CF ratio, led to an increase in loan originations for all, prime and 
subprime loans. However, loosening lending standards had a stronger effect on subprime loan 
















Log(Loan Origination) Log(Loan Origination) Log(Loan Origination)
VARIABLES 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
Conventional to FHA Ratio 0.278*** 0.260*** 0.845***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07)
Log(Applications) 1.137*** 1.156*** 0.670***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
FHA Loan Share 0.223*** -0.227*** -0.707***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
Prime-Jumbo Loan Share 0.967*** 0.688*** 0.358***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)






Table 5 (Cont.).  Effect of lending standards on mortgage credit expansion at the county 







Log(Loan Origination) Log(Loan Origination) Log(Loan Origination)
VARIABLES 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
LTICNV squared 0.021*** 0.046*** -0.013
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
LTICNV  0.177*** 0.144*** 0.302***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
LogINCCNV 0.487*** 0.394*** 0.295***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
LTIFHA squared -0.002* -0.005*** -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTIFHA  0.005** 0.010*** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LogINCFHA 0.057*** 0.054*** -0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Household Income) 0.506*** 0.572*** 1.848***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.14)
Household Income Growth -0.205*** -0.305*** -1.163***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14)
Home Price Growth 0.115*** 0.122*** 0.571***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06)
Unemployment Rate -1.111*** -0.815*** -4.262***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.59)
Poverty Level -0.338*** -0.465*** -0.519
(0.11) (0.11) (0.38)
Log (Total Population) -0.303*** -0.302*** 0.538***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11)
Constant 1.799*** 1.794*** -10.299***
(0.47) (0.48) (1.38)
Observations 4,687 4,687 2,207
R-squared 0.962 0.961 0.960





Table 6.  Effect of lending standards on loan acceptance rate and loan origination at the 
county level using alternative measures  
      
This table regresses county-level loan acceptance rate (columns 1, 2 and 3) and loan origination 
(columns 4, 5 and 6) on lending standard between year 2001 and 2006. The dependent variables are 
loan acceptance rate and log of loan origination aggregated at the county level. As robustness to our 
main lending standard measure, conventional to FHA ratio, we use three additional measures of 
lending standard: (i) Subprime to FHA loan acceptance rate, (ii) Prime to FHA loan acceptance rate, 
and (iii) Jumbo to FHA loan acceptance rate. Subprime and prime loans are identified using the 
HUD lender list. Loan applications received by subprime and non-subprime lenders are categorized 
as subprime and prime loans, respectively. This method of identification has limitations, since all 
loans received by a subprime lender are unlikely to be subprime loans. However, since HMDA data 
does not identify subprime loan applications (subprime loans originated can be identified starting 
2004), we use the HUD lender list for the purpose. Jumbo loans are those loans that are above the 
conforming loan limit. The regressions control for borrower characteristics and county-level 
variables. Home price growth and household income growth are the growth in median home price 
and median household income, respectively, between year t-1 and t. All other variables, including the 
dependent variables are in year t. They also include county and year fixed effects. We hypothesize 
that (i) Subprime to FHA loan acceptance rate, (ii) Prime to FHA loan acceptance rate, and (iii) 
Jumbo to FHA loan acceptance rate capture lending standards and can thus explain loan acceptance 
rate and loan origination at the county level. We find that loosening lending standards has a 
statistically significant effect on loan acceptance rate and loan origination. Standard errors in 



















VARIABLES 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
Subprime to FHA Ratio 0.163*** 0.262***
(0.01) (0.02)
Prime to FHA Ratio 0.066*** 0.129***
(0.01) (0.02)
Jumbo to FHA Ratio 0.011*** 0.021**
(0.00) (0.01)
Log(Applications) 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 1.131*** 1.155*** 1.179***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FHA Loan Share -0.034* -0.061*** -0.065*** 0.147*** 0.106* -0.039
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Prime-Jumbo Loan Share -0.084*** -0.066*** -0.010 0.927*** 0.960*** 1.427***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
SubPrime Loan Share -0.467*** -0.301*** -0.310*** -0.897*** -0.629*** -0.269***





Table 6 (Cont.).  Effect of lending standards on loan acceptance rate and loan origination at 






















VARIABLES 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06 2001-06
LTICNV squared -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 0.020*** 0.024*** -0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTICNV  0.018*** 0.020*** -0.000 0.174*** 0.177*** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
LogINCCNV 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.001 0.525*** 0.522*** -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
LTIFHA squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** 0.014***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTIFHA  0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.005** 0.004* -0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LogINCFHA 0.005 0.003 0.013*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.151***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Household Income) 0.045*** 0.036* 0.104*** 0.497*** 0.478*** 0.978***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Household Income Growth 0.013 0.022 -0.005 -0.181*** -0.166*** -0.411***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Home Price Growth 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.050*** 0.102*** 0.060*** 0.145***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Unemployment Rate -0.026 -0.003*** -0.399*** -0.897*** -0.013*** -2.293***
(0.06) (0.00) (0.07) (0.19) (0.00) (0.23)
Poverty Level -0.076** -0.059 -0.111*** -0.346*** -0.317*** -0.644***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Log (Total Population) -0.100*** -0.083*** -0.045*** -0.345*** -0.317*** -0.165***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Constant 0.887*** 0.607*** 0.372** 2.351*** 1.883*** 0.390
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.47) (0.48) (0.57)
Observations 4,687 4,687 4,640 4,687 4,687 4,640
R-squared 0.816 0.778 0.766 0.962 0.960 0.945





Table 7.  Effect of lending standards on loan acceptance rate and loan origination at the 
county level using alternate sample periods  
      
This table regresses county-level loan acceptance rate and loan origination on lending standard 
between (i) 1995 and 2000, (ii) 2007 and 2013, and (iii) 1995 and 2013. The dependent variables are 
loan acceptance rate and log of loan origination aggregated at the county level. In this table, we 
examine whether our lending standard measure, CF ratio, can explain loan acceptance rate and loan 
origination in years other than the housing boom years (2001 to 2006). The regressions control for 
borrower characteristics and county-level variables. Household income growth is the growth in 
median household income between year t-1 and t. Change in home price index is the change in 
FHFA Home Price Index between t-1 and t; we use this index instead of the median home price 
from Zillow due to data availability. All other variables, including the dependent variables are in year 
t. We also include county and year fixed effects. We find that loosening lending standards have a 
statistically significant effect on loan acceptance rate and loan origination in all three sample periods. 































VARIABLES 1995-2000 2007-2013 1995-2013 1995-2000 2007-2013 1995-2013
Conventional to FHA Ratio 0.232*** 0.046*** 0.115*** 0.375*** 0.063*** 0.166***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Applications) 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.964*** 0.981*** 1.047***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
FHA Loan Share 0.116*** -0.042*** 0.018*** 0.136*** -0.218*** -0.018
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Prime-Jumbo Loan Share -0.077*** -0.003 -0.037*** 0.586*** 0.657*** 0.618***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Subprime Loan Share -0.085*** -0.128*** -0.293*** 0.104*** -0.227*** -0.779***





Table 7 (Cont.).  Effect of lending standards on loan acceptance rate and loan origination at 






















VARIABLES 1995-2000 2007-2013 1995-2013 1995-2000 2007-2013 1995-2013
LTICNV squared -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 0.030*** 0.011*** 0.026***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LTICNV  0.031*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.132*** 0.048*** 0.144***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
LogINCCNV 0.100*** 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.497*** 0.336*** 0.545***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
LTIFHA squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002* 0.003***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LTIFHA  0.005*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.017***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LogINCFHA -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.003* -0.007 0.070*** 0.057***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Household Income) -0.031* 0.011 0.049*** 0.147*** 0.123*** 0.386***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Household Income Growth 0.029* -0.007 -0.030*** -0.100** -0.027 -0.132***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Change Home Price Index 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment Rate -0.000 0.000 -0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Poverty Level 0.006 0.021 -0.073*** 0.180 -0.224*** 0.180***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04)
Log (Total Population) 0.063*** -0.086*** -0.023*** 0.390*** 0.407*** -0.031***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
Constant -0.497*** 1.417*** 0.409*** -3.489*** -2.702*** -0.291***
(0.18) (0.15) (0.01) (0.46) (0.41) (0.04)
Observations 5,284 9,775 22,279 5,284 9,775 22,279
R-squared 0.832 0.770 0.725 0.973 0.910 0.991







We examine the relationship between bank conditions and the residential mortgage market 
before and during the 2007-09 financial crisis. In essay 1, we document a residential bank lending 
channel by showing the effect of bank distress on the residential housing market and employment 
between 2007 and 2009. Borrowers had difficulty obtaining credit in counties where banks were 
more distressed, since banks were reluctant to make residential loans that were harder to sell. We 
find that a median increase in bank distress, measured using the change in the ratio of jumbo loan 
acceptance rate to nonjumbo loan acceptance rate, explains an additional decline in county home 
prices of 1.5%, and an additional increase in county unemployment rate of 20 basis points; these 
changes explain 15% and 5%, respectively, of the median changes in these variables between 2007 
and 2009. 
In essay 2, we investigate the relationship between bank credit standards and residential 
mortgage expansion between 2001 and 2006. Easing credit standards increased mortgage supply to 
relatively lower creditworthy borrowers, which contributed to the housing boom. Until now, 
SLOOS was the only measure of mortgage credit standards. We introduce a more reliable measure 
of credit standard, the CF Ratio, which is the ratio of conventional loan acceptance rate to FHA 
loan acceptance rate. It has a positive correlation with loan acceptance rates between 1995 and 2013, 
both at the national and county levels, whereas, SLOOS fails to explain the sharp decline in credit 
standards during the housing boom years. After controlling for loan demand, applicant 
characteristics and county factors, we find that a one standard deviation weakening in credit 
standard accounts for 1.4% increase in loan acceptance rate, which represents 18.5% of the standard 
deviation in loan acceptance rate between 2001 and 2006. 
 
